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Abstract

Just-world theory research investigates how an individual’s world-view influences his/her
behavior when confronted with injustice. The purpose of the present study was to examine the
utility of multiple continual physiological measurements as predictors of just-world motivated
behavior such as immanent justice reasoning (IJR) in a replication of Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s
(2006) study. Participants (N=109) were assigned to one of two narrative groups – either an
adulterous scenario or a non-adulterous scenario. It was hypothesized that levels of IJR would
be higher in the justice-threat than the non-threat condition, and that measures of physiological
arousal would predict IJR. Results show that significantly higher responses of IJR were
observed during the non-adulterous condition. Additionally, physiological indicators of
emotional arousal correctly predicted IJR. These results indicate that physiological measures are
useful in assessing justice-threat scenarios, and further research should use such indicators in
addition to self-report affect measures.
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Introduction and Review of Literature
Human beings have always struggled against odds in order to carve out a place in the
world. Yet people seem to maintain a sense of optimism while constantly surrounded by
misfortune and tragedy. Why do people labor long and hard under harsh circumstances, while
evidence of the tenuousness of their existence is unavoidable? The fruits of our labor can be
stolen without notice. How do people maintain the belief that the world is a just place, and that a
given person will get what they “deserve” in the end? These questions are fundamental to the
study of just-world theory. Just-world theory suggests that – in general – people have a
cognitive bias to perceive the world as morally fair or just. It is the endeavor of just-world
theorists to study how this cognitive bias influences a person’s attitudes and behaviors.
The study of just-world theory formally began with Lerner and Simmons’ (1966)
pioneering study, in which the authors noticed a peculiar phenomenon in their research
participants. While participants watched a video of a girl being mercilessly electroshocked for
failing at a cognitive task, Lerner and Simmons observed that participants tended to blame the
victim for her poor performance. The authors found that there was a relationship between how
much the participants denigrate the character of a victim and whether or not the participants had
the power to alleviate the victim’s suffering. The results showed that participants who were
unable to help the victim were significantly more likely to derogate the character of the victim.
These findings suggest that when participants were unable to ease the suffering of a victim, they
found strategies that alleviated the stress they felt. Lerner and Simmons hypothesized that
people have an ingrained sense of justice, as well as a general tendency to protect this sense of
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justice by modifying their own attitudes when it is threatened by injustice that they cannot
control:
They proposed that people need to believe that the world is a just place in which
individuals get what they deserve. The need to believe in a just-world is reflected in how
people respond to justice and injustice in the world and, more broadly, in the way that
people orient their lives around issues of deservingness. For example, when the notion of
a just-world is threatened by contrary evidence, like the innocent victims in Lerner and
Simmons’s [sic] experiment, people may engage in a variety of behaviors that help to
maintain a sense of justice. These behaviors range from helping or compensating the
victim to psychological rationalization of the victim's fate – for example, perceiving the
victim’s fate as deserved (and, therefore, less unfair) because of her unworthy character.
(Hafer & Begue, 2005, pp. 128 – 129)
Theories Regarding Belief in a Just World
Lerner hypothesized that people come to function in the world as if they have a personal
contract that provides hope that their struggles might not be in vain (Lerner, 1977; Lerner &
Miller, 1978). That is, in order for people to believe that the effort they exert in life will pay off,
they may develop an implicit assumption that there are rules to the way the world works (i.e. a
personal contract). Researchers have hypothesized that if this were not the case, it would be hard
for people to justify the amount of effort they invest in their future. It was assumed that this
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belief in a just world (BJW)1 was a natural developmental process because individuals must learn
to subjugate their immediate will, and delay rewards from personal investments for a later time:
From this perspective, the fate of others becomes important in part because indications
that others are not getting what they deserve (to the extent that others are seen as
members of one’s own world) threaten the notion that the world is just and, therefore,
one’s commitment to the personal contract, a concept around which much of life is
organized. (Hafer & Begue, 2005, p. 130)
Lerner (1977) expected nearly all people, under reasonably stable living conditions, to
develop a theory (i.e. belief) that the world is just, and he suspected that people are motivated to
protect this belief when the events in a person’s life present contrary evidence. Lerner originally
developed the theory to explain the findings in Lerner and Simmons (1966) – that people have a
general motivation to maintain a belief in justice, and that they have a variety of strategies to do
so (Lerner, 1980). Historically speaking, cultures have employed this human characteristic
through the creation of complete ethical frameworks, which were socially engineered to
convince common people that goodness of character and hard work will result in rewards in this
life or in the next. This concept is not unlike the Puritan ethical framework in the United States
(Weber, 1905/2002).
Personality and Individual Difference Measures regarding Belief in a Just World
A self-report measure was developed by Rubin and Peplau (1975) in order to measure the
relative strength (i.e. degree) of an individual’s BJW. Rubin and Peplau's work was based on

1

Contained in Appendix A is a key of all acronyms used throughout this document for the

reader’s convenience.
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prior research that suggested a person’s tendency to blame victims, under controlled conditions,
could be predicted by assessments of the participant’s religiosity, authoritarianism, and locus of
control. The researcher’s goal was to develop an individual difference personality construct
assessment that had more predictive power towards just-world motivated behaviors (JMB), such
as victim blame, rather than other less direct assessments (i.e. religiosity). In Rubin and Peplau's
self-report survey, they selected direct questions about participants’ beliefs that focused on how
just participants believed the world to be (e.g. “Basically, the world is a just place”). The direct
questioning approach evolved from Rubin and Peplau's original assessment, and many just-world
theorists use these individual difference assessments as indicators of individuals' implicit
need/motivation to believe in a just world (Hafer & Begue, 2005; Schmitt, 1998), and attempt to
predict subsequent JMB from these indicators.
Rubin and Peplau’s (1975) just-world measure was the gold standard until recently when
a new generation of measures was adopted. Several critiques have been written about Rubin and
Peplau’s general psychometric measure (Furnham, 1998, 2003; Furnham & Procter, 1989; Maes,
1998; Schmitt, 1998). The first consideration focused on the semi-orthogonal nature of the two
types of questions in their scales (e.g. just and unjust questions). Just questions take the form:
“People who get ‘lucky breaks’ usually have earned their good fortune,” and unjust questions:
“Good deeds often go unnoticed and unrewarded.” This suggested that questions that positively
assert that the world is a just place are assessing a distinctly different construct than questions
that negatively assert that the world is unjust. That is to say, a participant might report both that
the world is just and that the world is unjust, which means something unique to just-world theory
(Dalbert, Lipkus, & Goch, 2001). This phenomenon could potentially be a result of certain
response biases, especially an affirming response style. Some researchers in this area have built
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validity measures into their scales to assist in accounting for this behavior. The most popular
measures to date, however, have unfortunately dropped such validity measures from the scales.
Additionally, Rubin and Peplau’s assessment used specific questions of a non-general nature
(e.g. “It is often impossible for a person to receive a fair trial in the USA.”), which led to
relatively low levels of reliability, as represented by Cronbach’s alpha (see Schmitt, 1998;
Furnham & Procter, 1989). Improved measures were devised (see Dalbert, 1999; Dalbert,
Montada, & Schmitt, 1987; Furnham & Procter, 1989; Lipkus, 1991; Maes & Schmitt, 1999) in
order to further develop Rubin and Peplau’s BJW measure and have been commonly used since.
Regardless of the psychometric improvements made to BJW assessments, self-report individual
difference measures of a BJW remain weak predictors of JMB (Hafer & Begue, 2005).
Additionally, newer theories suggest that self-report measures do little to assess implicit
motivation at the core of just-world theory, and that researchers should seek alternative means to
assess implicit motivations (see Dalbert, 2001; Hafer, 2000; Kay & Jost, 2003). Moreover, it has
been found that the new generation of BJW measures have their own set of problems, such as
response bias issues and a positive correlation with social desirability measures (Guzewicz &
Takooshian, 1992; Heaven & Connors, 1988; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983; Lerner, 1978; Loo,
2002; Schmitt et al., 1991). This suggests that much of what BJW measures might be assessing
is actually a social desirability or affirmation response bias.
Just-World Theory Scenario Domains
Due in part to the extraordinary diversity of ways by which a person may be threatened
because of injustice, experimental investigations of just-world theory have sought to utilize a
great variety of different scenarios of injustice (i.e. contextual topics/domains). An example of a
scenario might be in a school setting, such as getting a bad grade undeservingly (Dalbert &
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Stoeber, 2006). Another would be in the American judicial system (Kivisto & Swan, 2011) as to
whether or not someone can expect a fair trial; either way, distinctions between these different
environments are rarely the topic of interest. Experimenters are most concerned with whether or
not a scenario will induce a group of participants to exhibit JMB.
It seems that sexual assaults are one of the most commonly investigated scenarios. This
is possibly because of the propensity for sexual assaults to provoke a potent defensive emotional
response in participants. This suggests that emotional intensity is an influential component in
justice-motivated rationalizations. Other domain scenarios have been used, for instance:
HIV/AIDS (Correia & Vala, 2003), car accidents (Callan, Ellard, & Nicol, 2006), gambling
losses (translated, Schmitt, 1991), kidnappings (Ellard et al., 2002), electric shock (Feinberg et
al. 1982), poverty (Pancer, 1988), shootings (Simmons & Mitch, 1985), stalking (Sheridan et al.,
2003), layoffs (Skarlicki et al., 1998), and even inflicting injustices on participants
experimentally (Dalbert, 2002). All of the aforementioned have been experimentally used to
provoke an intense sense of injustice in a participant.
Just-World Motivated Defensive Strategies
Lerner (1980) outlined strategies that people use to reduce threats to their personal beliefs
in a just world (i.e. justice-threats). He believed that each strategy would fit into one of nine
categories. The first two are considered rational strategies. They consist of (1) a motivation to
prevent the possibility of an injustice occurring in the future (“prevention”), and (2) a motivation
to compensate a victim of an injustice (“restitution”). Both strategies incorporate the
acknowledgement that an injustice did occur, hence their label of “rational.” In addition to the
rational strategies, Lerner added four non-rational strategies to the list. They consist of (3)
denial/withdrawal, characterized by an avoidance of a threat, (4) reinterpretation of cause,
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characterized by a rationalization that a victim is to blame based on possible actions which make
the victim responsible for their misfortune, (5) reinterpretation of character, where qualities of a
person are changed in order to make them seem more deserving of, for example, a layoff and (6)
reinterpretation of outcome, to interpret an outcome as not really being as bad, or even as a
valuable experience. The “non-rational” rationalization strategies all incorporate an
unwillingness to acknowledge that an injustice has occurred.
Lerner (1980) proposed two additional defensive strategies that could be better
understood as worldviews. (7a) The first world view is called ultimate justice. This is best
characterized by a belief that people will, at some point, receive justice. Ultimate justice
incorporates ideas (i.e. beliefs) such as fate, a reward or punishment in an afterlife, and/or a
general expectation of “karma.” (7b) A variant of ultimate justice is immanent justice reasoning
(IJR) which, instead of stretching the resulted consequences of one’s behavior to a point in the
unforeseen future, IJRs make a much closer connection between one’s actions and his/her
consequences, temporally and causally (Maes & Kal, 2002). That is, ignoring metaphysical
explanations, IJR simply assumes that justice will be served in a timely and decisive manner.
Alternatively, as Piaget coined, “fault will automatically bring about its own punishment”
(Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 256). (8) The second worldview was coined by Hafer and Begue (2005)
as a “multiple worldview.” This consisted of a perspective that the rules of one’s personal
contract only apply in certain environments. For example, injustice might be the rule in other
countries stricken with poverty and corruption, but in the environment of the observer/individual,
one’s expectations of a just world are realistic. Distinctions could even be made with
environments that are bumped up against (or even layered upon) each other; for example, a
ghetto surrounded by a city could have distinctly different rules from the city that encircles it.
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(9) The last defensive strategy was called the “penultimate defense” by Lerner, and was coined
in Hafer and Begue as the “False Cynic” defense. This strategy occurs when a person expresses
that they do not believe the world to be a just place, yet harbors strong implicit feelings to the
contrary (Holmes, Miller, & Lerner, 2002). It is evident that, if experimental participants use the
“False Cynic” defensive strategy, this could greatly distort explicit self-report measure results.
One of the difficulties with studying different defensive strategies is that, in any
ambiguous and open-ended injustice provoking scenario, nearly any injustice defensive strategy
can be used. Using Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s (2006) first study scenario as an example, a man
falls victim to a horrific car impact while walking across the street. Just-world theory would
suggest that because of the injustice threatening, and emotionally arousing nature of the event,
people are highly likely to utilize defensive strategies to explain such an event (in order to calm
themselves or reduce dissonance). One way different defensive strategies could be characterized
is by what a person says about an event. A few examples of what a person might say, that is
dependent upon what justice motivated defensive strategy is being used, include: “I should
petition the local government to install better walk/don’t walk signals” (prevention), “I should
go bring him flowers in the hospital” (restitution), “I doubt he even got hit that hard, and the
news anchor is exaggerating” (denial/withdrawal), “He must have forgotten to look both ways
before crossing the road” (reinterpretation of cause), “He must have been an unperceptive and
careless individual” (reinterpretation of character), “I am sure he learned a valuable lesson about
crossing the road” (reinterpretation of outcome), “He is in a better place now” (ultimate justice),
“Well, that’s California for you, no one there knows how to drive” (multiple worldview), and
“You never know when a freak accident is going to happen” (penultimate defense).
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Three things become immediately clear when noting the ease and diversity of these
different strategies. First, an individual has many ways at his/her disposal to eliminate justicethreats. Second, that not any one explanation is mutually exclusive of another as an explanation
for unjust events, and that it is not only possible, but also likely that an individual will use
multiple approaches. Third, there are individual differences in the propensity to utilize different
methods, and some methods might not be used at all by a given individual. For example, an
ultimate justice explanation such as, “Evil doers will get their comeuppance in the afterlife,”
does not likely lend itself to be used among individuals who do not believe in an afterlife.
There are many different strategies for investigating JMB. JMBs seem to manifest in
situations that are perceived to be unfair to the observer. An experimental manipulation is
performed by comparing two scenarios: one with a hypothesized justice-threat (i.e. experimental
condition), and another scenario as similar to the experimental condition scenario as possible, but
without any perceived injustice (i.e. control condition). The experimental manipulations used to
create levels of justice-threat provocation have multiplied over the years, and used an assortment
of different variables. Some examples are: the duration of an injustice (Ellard et al, 2002; Hafer,
2000b), the noticeability or salience of an injustice (Schuller et al., 1994), how responsible a
participant feels when s/he are the subject of an injustice (Correia & Vala, 2003), attractiveness
of person (utilizing the halo effect; Callan, Powell, & Ellard, 2007; Dion & Dion, 1987), how
severely a person suffers (Callan, Ellard, & Nicol, 2006), whether or not the perpetrator of
injustice was punished (Hafer, 2000a), and whether or not a participant was allowed to
compensate a victim (Lerner & Simmons, 1966). All these experimental manipulations can be
reduced down to three general methods as outlined by Hafer and Begue (2005). It is also
important to note that these methods are “ambiguous with respect to fairness” (Hafer & Begue,
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2005, p. 136). The first is the character of the target, next being the behavior of the target, and
the final aspect being the intensity of the consequence.
The measures used to evaluate JMB are just as diverse, and are often crafted in order to
target a particular defensive strategy. Examples are measures that assess the participant’s
tendency to blame the victim (Triplet, 1992), a participant’s assessment of a person’s
deservingness of misfortune or reward (Correia & Vala, 2003), a participant’s perceived
senselessness of an unjust event (Lodewijkx et al., 2001), the proximate avoidance of a
participant from a perceived injustice (e.g. distance stood from a poster of a starving child in
Africa; Pancer, 1988), the amount a person would pay in restitutions to a victim (Skarlicki et al.,
1998), how demonic or evil a perpetrator of an injustice is perceived to be (Ellard et al., 2002),
whether or not/how much a participant will believe that two events are causally related (Callan,
Ellard, & Nicol, 2006), and the effects of cognitive load on IJR behaviors (e.g. participants
memorized a long string of digits before responding, which impacted their likelihood to blame
the victim; Callan, Sutton, & Dovale, 2010).
Experimental Methods Regarding Just-World Theory
There is some finesse involved in how experimenters choose the method they want to use
to induce a justice-threat, because it must be tailored to the JMB they wish to detect. Designs
seem to be custom-made in order to show that a particular type of defensive strategy is being
performed (i.e. answering questions about whether or not a particular strategy even exists). Yet,
when an experiment is designed to show that a particular strategy exists, it may also conceal
other strategies that participants might be utilizing. An example of this might be an experimental
question that asks about the social character (i.e. victim blame denigration, by a reinterpretation
of character) of a woman who is actively being shocked on video while trying to perform a task.
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This particular scenario was reported in Lerner's (1980) book and was based on an unpublished
study (pp. 76 – 77). Under this type of scenario, researchers often chose to observe whether
participants were blaming the victim by assessing if participants believed the woman in the video
was not very good at her task. This defensive strategy is best interpreted as a reinterpretation of
the women’s character. Nevertheless, under the same scenario, participants might alternatively
utilize the reinterpretation of outcome defensive strategy instead of reinterpretation of character.
An example of participants reinterpreting the outcome of the scenario would be if participants
adopted the attitude that the woman’s punishment helped her to improve her task performance.
Lerner's (1980) study even suggested in the experiment’s introduction that electrical shocks were
being used on the woman to give her incentive to improve her performance. In assessing
whether participants believe the woman is generally bad at her task would ask different questions
than if they were assessing whether participants believed the woman’s punishment improved her
performance. Thus, if researchers only assessed one of the two defensive strategies, the other
strategy would not be observed regardless of how commonly it was used. Alternatively, if
researchers assessed multiple strategies in succession, each question may have influenced how
participants answered subsequent questions. Therefore, there are pros and cons to observing
only one JMB defensive strategy in an experiment.
A second example of this is demonstrated in Ellard et al. (2002), who investigated a
participant’s tendency to label a perpetrator of injustice as “evil,” while observing individual
difference scores of general BJW. The study found that when general BJW measures were high
for a participant, it increased the likelihood that said participant would demonize the perpetrator
of injustice. This defensive strategy can be interpreted as a subset of the “multiple worldview”
where the unjust act is ameliorated into a rare, senseless anomaly unrepresentative of the real
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world. One of the strengths of this experiment is that it provides direct support that the strategy
of demonization exists. A drawback, however, is that in order to demonstrate this behavior is
indeed being performed, it requires there to be a relatively low percentage of individuals in the
sample who are readily prone to declaring they believe in the existence of demonic interventions.
Believing a demonic influence is the cause for injustices is by no means a universal belief,
however, it only takes one person to show that this behavior is possible.
Newer Experimental Methods Regarding Just-World
As explained above (also see Hafer & Begue, 2005), some experimental scenarios do not
lend themselves to the use of one particular defensive strategy or another, and in some cases a
participant might employ multiple strategies simultaneously. Two methods currently exist which
have the ability to parse apart whichever strategy participants utilize. First, a researcher can try
to lead the majority of participants into one particular strategy in an experimental situation (so
that multiple strategies cannot or will not be used). An alternative method is that a researcher
may try to cast a larger net in order to observe different possible defensive strategies at once.
Because both of these methods have drawbacks, there is reason to look at newer experimental
designs. An example of such an improved method can be found in Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s
(2006) study. They used a design akin to casting a larger net, but with an innovative
modification. The experiment was designed to obtain information about the strategies
participants were using in order to rationalize a causal link between two events that were very
unlikely to be causally related. Researchers motivated participants to rationalize a causal
connection by threatening their sense of justice. The researchers were trying to demonstrate the
existence of one particular strategy – IJR. This was shown when a participant reported – using a
Likert scale – that they were confident there was causal relationship between the two events.
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Nevertheless, after the researchers obtained a measure of the participants’ defensive strategy (i.e.
IJR), they asked the participants a subsequent open-ended question. The researchers then
categorized the responses to the open-ended question in order to determine which strategies
participants were using to substantiate their decisions.
At first glance, it is hard to see why asking the participants the reason they chose a certain
answer is a method that could not be used with any defensive strategy, but it becomes clearer
when one attempts to utilize it with other defensive strategies (i.e. victim blame in the form of
character degradation). For instance, IJR is observed when a participant (or anyone) causally
relates two events that are not rationally causally relatable (e.g. people who win the lottery are
getting payback for being good). This behavior was first observed by Piaget (1932/1965) in
children. It was Callan, Ellard, and Nicol's (2006) goal to provide support that adults were
susceptible to the same reasoning when provoked. When participants stated clearly that two
events were causally related, there was no ambiguity in what they reported. Therefore, when an
experimenter asked the participants why they believed there was a relationship, it was the
participants’ job to substantiate their claim, thereby providing a clue as to their defensive
strategy. An example of a participant’s answer might be that the recipient of misfortune
“deserved” it, it was fate, or the person was unintelligent. Nonetheless, the important aspect is
that participants are not likely to have a reason to rationalize a causal connection unless they are
being motivated to do so.
Compare the IJR example to that of the JMB of victim blame (Lerner, 1980, pp. 76 - 77).
An experimenter might ask of a participant whether they thought a recipient of misfortune was
incompetent (i.e. blame worthy) at a task, for example, as a memory task performed while being
shocked for wrong answers. When a participant asserts that they thought a recipient of
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misfortune (i.e. the person being shocked) was indeed incompetent, the experimenter may then
ask the participant the reason they think it to be the case. It then becomes clear that it is a
perfectly logical answer for the participant to say, “Because the woman was getting questions
wrong” which unfortunately provides no clue as to which defensive strategy is being used by the
participant.
One of the examples used in Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s (2006) experiment was to induce
participants to report a causal relationship between the events of a man named David in a brutal
car accident, and his behavior with regards to a woman named Susanne – his travel agent. The
dependent measure question asked, “To what extent do you feel David’s accident was the result
of his dealings with Susanne?” (p. 1649). The scale was rated from 1 – Not at all to 7 – A great
deal. The scenarios they used in their experiment were valence modifications of David’s
character. In the first scenario, David was depicted as a hard working husband who was
planning a vacation for his family with a female travel agent, Susanne. In the second scenario,
David was a hard working husband who had a one night stand with a woman named Susanne.
Results showed that participants were far more likely to assert that a causal relationship existed
between David’s accident and his dealing with Susanne, when David’s dealings were of an
adulterous nature. This would suggest that people are more likely to commit an IJR when a
person is perceived as deserving of his/her misfortune (deservedness was also being assessed).
Callan, Ellard, and Nicol, however, cited an experimental confound:
The automobile accident scenario, although carefully crafted to not link the accident to
the victim’s behavior, might nonetheless have left room for participants to develop a
naturalistic causal chain to his behavior by inferring, for instance in the cheating
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condition, that the cheating had induced preoccupying feelings of guilt that made it more
likely he would not notice a car coming at him. (p. 1650)
In Callan, Sutton, and Dovale (2010), the authors reused their original car accident scenario for
an experiment involving IJR and cognitive load. The present study utilizes the original version
of the narrative, thus not attempting to prevent the rational inclination to fault stress as the cause
of the accident.
Issues Concerning the Assessment of Justice Motivated Behavior
An interesting experimental quality – observed in Callan, Ellard, and Nicol (2006) and
outlined above – concerns the likelihood of the participant to report any causal relationship at all.
Intuitively, we would expect that not all participants would be prone to using an IJR defensive
strategy, as this would require them to assume an unlikely causal relationship. In their second
study, Callan, Ellard, and Nicol reported that only 41% of participants showed IJR in the
experimental condition, as compared to only 7% in the control condition. This meant that only a
minority of participants made any response other than ‘1: no causal relationship at all’. In
Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s first study, however, 70% of participants reported a possible causal
connection between the two events, compared to 50% in the control condition. This might be
because the first scenario allowed for a very unlikely (but rational) possibility that the two events
were linked. Both the first and second studies showed significant increases in the participants’
assertions of an improbable causal relationship when the scenario’s character “deserved” it. The
results found by Callan, Ellard, and Nicol suggest that even though a small subset of IJR prone
participants were sufficient to demonstrate IJR had occurred, there was still a smaller subset of
participants who asserted a causal connection when character did not “deserve” it. This is
reminiscent of the previous discussion which suggested that it is often the case that only a small
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subset of predisposed participants are required to show that a particular defensive strategy had
been used. These issues have been illustrated before by others (Schmitt, 1998). Lerner (1998, p.
263) also commented on the inherent positive skew of participants’ reports of BJW. That is,
participants with high scores of BJW are a minority in experiments.
An important point can be drawn thus far with regard to the nature of just-world research
investigations of JMB defensive strategies. First, BJW measures are a useful and effective
predictor of the strength of an individual’s motivation to ameliorate justice-threats. Second,
some unique JMB (such as IJR), require a strong justice motivation to be performed by a
participant. This would then mean that when targeting more rare justice behaviors (e.g.
demonization) participants who exhibit a wide variety of personality styles are needed in the
sample. As Lerner (1998, p. 263) explains, these participants make up a low proportion of any
sample. It is possible that this is why BJW measures have been an inconsistent predictor of
behavior.
Interestingly, in Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s (2006) third study, Lupkis’s (1991) General
Belief in a Just-World Scale (GBJWS) was not a significant predictor of the JMB of IJR (the
only study in which GBJWS was used). It is possible that if Callan, Ellard, and Nicol compared
their IJR study with another version of the study that did not require as high a threshold of justice
motivation, then GBJWS could be a significant predictor. Contemporary approaches to dealing
with the inconsistencies of BJW measures have usually been to design self-report measures that
have an improved ability to predict JMB (Dalbert, 1999; Dalbert, Montada, & Schmitt, 1987;
Furnham & Procter, 1989; Lipkus, 1991; Maes & Schmitt, 1999), and to reinterpret the nature of
the underlying constructs (Dalbert & Lipkus, 2001). Nevertheless, such endeavors have had
mixed results (Hafer & Begue, 2005; Dalbert, 2009). It seems as though a better method could
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be devised that assesses the idiosyncratic qualities of individual’s propensity to select a particular
defensive strategy over another, and not a “one scale fits all” approach. This “one scale fits all”
approach assumes that individuals who have a strong BJW will have an equal tendency to
perform high threshold JMB (i.e. IJR, demonizing). It also may be worthwhile to consider that
cultural dynamics might play a strong role in the interplay between personality and situational
factors.
Categorization of Defensive Strategies
As mentioned above, to assess what rationalization techniques participants were using to
suggest there was a causal relationship between two (improbably related) events, Callan, Ellard,
and Nicol’s (2006) third study prompted an open-ended response contingent upon the
participant’s answer to the causal relationship question: “Please briefly describe your rationale
for your rating in the space provided” (p. 1644). Responses were categorized qualitatively, the
most common being chance, naturalistic-incomplete (i.e. reinterpretation), Justice and Fate (i.e.
IJR or ultimate justice), and other. This is a clear indication that different strategies are being
used by participants, and it presents a method by which an experimenter might access which
class of strategy a particular participant is using. Additionally, interesting information regarding
personality may be related to which reasoning strategy participants employ.
The Impact of Emotions on Behavior Regarding Just-World Theory
The array of experiments concerning the investigations of just-world theory has done
much to map out the diverse circumstances in which the phenomenon of JMB takes place.
Nevertheless, predicting how individuals might react under certain circumstances remains
difficult. As discussed previously, the predictive ability of self-report measures remains a
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relatively unreliable predictor with regards to JMB (Hafer & Begue, 2005; Callan, Ellard, and
Nicol, 2006; Callan, Ferguson, & Bindemann, 2012).
It is possible that a predictor specific to the situation of JMB could be based on the
emotional effect of the stimuli. In Lerner’s (1980) book, he points out that the stimuli used
should be impactful emotionally in order to evoke the JMB. Two experiments initially provided
support for this supposition (Lerner, 1971; Simons & Piliavin, 1972). It is one of the central
tenets of just-world theory that injustice is emotionally arousing, and that the effects of the
perceived injustice initiates defensive strategies. It is possible that this is why just-world
scenarios that utilize sexual assaults are so effective at provoking JMBs. It has been suggested
that narrative depictions of sexual assaults are very negatively emotionally arousing (Baumeister,
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). Epstein’s (1990, 2003) dual process theory has been
discussed in the context of social psychology and just-world hypothesis (Lerner, 1998, 2003;
Lerner & Goldberg, 1999). The theory suggests that if stimuli are not sufficiently potent,
rational cognitive resources (explicit processes) are more likely to be used when considering
injustice. This would cause thoughtful responses from participants, which in turn would reduce
the chances of non-rational JMB like blaming the victim. When emotional stimulation is
sufficient, automatic heuristic processes (implicit processes) are likely to dominate cognition,
while irrational defensive strategies (e.g. IJR) become a more common response to perceived
injustices.
One well observed consequence of Epstein’s dual process theory is the difference in time
that individuals take to make a decision using either explicit or implicit processes. This
difference is usually asessed by measuring the speed at which individuals answer a question –
also known as question latency. When individuals are impacted emotionally, the theory suggests
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that they are using a more implicit or automatic heuristic approach to decision making. The
heuristic approach can have multiple effects on question latency. It could cause individuals to
answer questions more quickly, because there is less thought involved in the decision.
Conversely, it could cause them to take more time because their emotions actively
overcomplicate what would be an easy rational cognitive process. Most recently, Temple and
Geisiner (1990) found further support that response latencies are indicators of emotional arousal.
Temple and Geisinger used true/false question response latencies taken from word and character
paired self-report statements that had different levels of arousal. They found that arousing
statements took participants significantly longer to respond to as compared to the emotionally
neutral questions.
In addition to Epstein’s (1990, 2003) theory, support has been presented that suggests
that misattribution of emotional arousal can influence the probability of JMB to occur. In
Thornton’s (1984) work, he found a significant difference in the probability that a participant
would blame a victim when the experimenter attributed the anxiety the participant felt to being in
an experiment (i.e. general attribution), rather than to the effect of listening to the story of a
sexual assault victim (i.e. specific attribution). Thornton’s second experimental manipulation
was to prime participants to be more self-conscious or aware of their emotions – a method used
in contemporary literature (Hafer, Begue, 2005; Callan, Ellard, & Nicol, 2006; Callan, Sutton &
Dovale, 2010). In doing so, Thornton found that in conditions where participant emotions were
primed, there was a significant increase in defensive blaming of the victim. This suggests that
designing experiments to prime the participant into a more emotionally aware state could
increase the likelihood a participant would display JMB.
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If the emotional intensity of injustice influences the likelihood of JMB occurring, then the
question becomes how one assesses individual differences in emotional intensity with regard to
injustice stimuli. One method is to use self-report measures. Dependent measures that assess
affect have been used (Dalbert, 2002; Hafer & Olson, 1989). Nonetheless, substantial issues
have been found with this method, and self-report measures may not be the best indicators of
emotional arousal (see Olson, Hafer, Couzens, & Kramins, 2000; Olson, Hafer, & Taylor, 2001).
Participants might have difficulty accessing their implicit affective states in a way that can be
reported on a self-report measure explicitly – social issues also confound this process. Variables
like social desirability can sometimes correlate with self-report measures of general BJW (Hafer
& Bugue, 2005). This suggests that self-reporting of emotional states might be more dependent
on the affective state the participant wants to portray socially to the experimenter rather than the
implicit affective state induced by the stimulus in question. For example, participants might not
want to report that they were “freaked out” by the account of an HIV/AIDS patient for cultural
reasons.
Physiological Measures of Emotion
Physiological measures have been used in order to assess changes in physiological
arousal that are thought to be a result of changes in emotional states. These physiological
measures may be a better window into how a person is feeling than self-report and behavioral
measures of affective states (Blascovich, 2000). Several calls have been made for physiological
assessments to be used in the study of justice motivated behavior (Hafer & Bugue 2005; Tomaka
& Blascovich, 1994), but as of yet, no physiological study concerning JMB has been published
to the author’s knowledge.
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Physiological measures have been used in the area of cognitive dissonance arousal and
attitude change (Elliot & Devine, 1994; Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Elkin & Leippe, 1986; Jarcho,
Berkman, & Lieberman, 2010). Lerner (1980) explained that the central basis of just-world
theory is founded in the theoretical basis of cognitive dissonance theory, and that just-world
theory is probably a more complex phenomenon. Based on Aronson’s (1969) book, Lerner
suggests that:
When a person is confronted with evidence that the world is not just in some sense, then
we can reasonably expect that a state of dissonance has been created, and can rely on the
body of literature on that subject to help us predict how that person will react
subsequently. (pp. 36 – 37)
Nevertheless, Lerner goes on to say that dissonance theory is limited as a complete explanation.
He proposes that dissonance theory does not explain why people become “strongly committed”
(p. 37) to a BJW, and that the negative drive state characterized in dissonance theory is not the
only dynamic behind JMB. Lerner continues by explaining that just-world theory involves the
“very integrity of their conception of themselves and the nature of their world” (p. 37). It might
be that a person’s BJW and belief attributions are changed (or are iteratively shaped) over time in
order to reduce dissonance. Similarly, a person’s susceptibility/sensitivity (e.g. unique cultural
dynamics, personality traits, etc.) to justice-threats influence the development of higher levels of
BJW.
Based on this dissonance framework a few physiological experiments involving justworld theory have used similar physiological tools as those who previously studied dissonance.
Lerner (1980, pp. 76 - 77) references an unpublished study using galvanic skin response, which
he reported supported the claim that in order to obtain JMB such as victim blame, participants’
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need to believe that a video of a girl being shocked was real, not staged. This was shown in the
mean galvanic skin response between two groups: naïve (that did not know it was an act) and
disabused (that were told it was an act). It was observed that in the naïve group, mean galvanic
skin response, and negative character evaluations of the shock victim were significantly higher
than in the disabused group. Lerner suggested that, ironically, participants that experience a
greater empathic arousal to a victim’s misfortune are more prone to engage in the JMB of victim
blame. The difficult interplay, however, between the effects of just-world theory and pro-social
empathy are not yet resolved (Blader & Tyler, 2002).
Measuring Physiological Arousal
Researchers took on the task of investigating whether individual difference measures of
BJW could be used to predict arousal under various situations. For example, Tomaka and
Blascovish (1994), found that Rubin and Peplau’s (1975) individual difference measure was a
significant predictor of physiological arousal pertaining to a stressful mental arithmetic task,
which suggest a complex yet reliable stress moderating effect for just-world beliefs. Tomaka
and Blascovish used a variety of physiological measures. A brief list consisting of
cardiovascular pre-ejection period, heart rate, total peripheral resistance (a derivative of blood
pressure), and electrodermal response were all significantly predicted by belief in just world.
Tomaka and Blascovish made the point that multiple physiological measures might be necessary
in order to understand the differences in physiological arousal. Multiple measures are also
necessary because of the cultural and individual differences among research participants’
physiological responses to stimuli (Levenson et al., 1992). As Levenson et al. showed, there
seems to be a cultural or at least an environmental (e.g. climate, diet, elevation, etc.) effect on
physiological response to psychological arousal. For example, an individual’s sympathetic
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nervous system might be activated as a result of emotionally arousing stimuli, but this individual
might show changes in heart rate, but not in electrodermal response – or vice versa. In order to
reduce the probability of Type II errors, Blascovich and Kelsey (1990) advise future researchers
to use multiple measures of physiological arousal in their studies. In their article, they suggest
using skin conductance and peripheral skin temperature, as well as cardiovascular measures,
which do not require a pressure cuff such as heart rate, respiratory sinus arrhythmia, pre-ejection
period, and pulse transit time.
These studies establish that, at least to some extent, the construct of BJW is linked to
factors that influence emotional arousal. This does not tell us much about the relationships that
do exist, and even less about the possible causal implications that a BJW might have. Several
studies have indicated that such a relationship exists and that physiological measures may be an
invaluable tool to assess, on a more granular level, how individuals are responding to justicethreats.
Non-Emotion Based Factors Influencing Justice Motivated Behaviors
There are experimental complications in the study of emotion-based theories. In Dion
and Dion (1987), just-world individual difference scores predicted that the participant’s social
character ratings and expected life outcomes of females and males would be positively correlated
with their level of physical attractiveness. This phenomenon is otherwise known as the halo
effect, by which one’s judgments of another person’s character can be influenced by one's overall
impression of him or her (Kaplan, 1978). The effect of physical attractiveness on one’s
formation of immediate positive impressions has been well documented. Dion and Dion’s
research specifically addressed whether individuals with BJW were more susceptible to this
cognitive bias. They hypothesized that individuals with more BJW would view persons with
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more attractive faces as being more virtuous in character and would have better life prospects.
What they had not anticipated in their hypotheses was that participants with high BJW scores
predicted better character and life outcomes from attractive male stimulus faces, but not for
female faces. Part of Dion and Dion’s explanation for this is that in conditions of relatively low
just-world threat (i.e. low emotional arousal), decision making stereotyped heuristics (which
were thought to be developed from BJW in the first place) might dominate social
decisions/perceptions such as character ratings. Yet female stimulus faces seemed to garner
greater consideration from participants than male faces. This may have ultimately lead to
participants devising more complex stereotyped status characteristics than ought to be devised
from genderless physical attributes. Moreover, when individuals are in situations of low arousal,
these social schemas are dominant and potentially difficult to predict.
Lerner (1978) suggested a similar explanation for another study that showed a greater
likelihood of participants with high scores of BJW as more likely to denigrate minorities of low
social standing. This would suggest that, like Dion and Dion (1987), an individual’s stereotype
biases can play an obscuring role when discerning how much effect a BJW has upon blaming
victims. It should be noted, though, that BJW measures reliably correlate with measurements of
individual’s religiosity, authoritarianism, and conservatism and that these constructs of are often
offered up as an explanation for low social standing decimation (Hafer & Begue, 2005).
Additionally, these constructs were not being observed nor controlled for by partial correlation
analyses in Lerner’s (1978) low social standing study. These points aside, the justice theory
explanation for this behavior was that stereotypically impoverished minority groups were more
likely to be stereotyped negatively by individuals with high BJW as a defensive strategy in order
to account for their perceived impoverished state (e.g., they are unemployed because they are

PSYSIOLOGICAL REASONING

25

lazy). Lerner suggested that these schemas then become an ingrained stereotype that manifests
even in the absence of just-world threat emotional arousal. This would suggest that there are
many situations in which just-world schema have become developmentally entrenched
throughout a person’s life, and that these just-world schemas need little provocation to activate
during tasks such as social assessments (Lerner, 2003). It seems as though there is great
diversity in the ways by which just-world coping mechanisms might ameliorate just-world
threats in high and low justice motivated individuals, all the while advancing little emotional or
physiological clues as verification (Kay & Jost, 2003; Maes, 1998c). It might be likely that
emotionally based influences can go undetected because of the high number of non-emotion
based psychological influences in existence (i.e. schemas, stereotypes, etc.). Nevertheless,
because of suggestions to the contrary, an investigation of emotionally based influences should
be conducted.
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Hypotheses

Belief in a Just-World Measures
The first class of hypotheses addressed the question of what role self-report assessments
of belief in just-world (BJW) play in predicting justice motivated behaviors (JMB). Did BJW
self-report assessments predict JMBs like immanent justice reasoning (IJR)? In addition, if BJW
measures were significant predictors of IJR, how much predictive power was added by
observations of emotional arousal – through means of physiological measures – when induced by
justice-threat provoking stimuli? Lastly, was there a connection between individuals’ scores on
BJW assessments, and how emotionally arousing they found justice-threats?
1) Do BJW measures correlate with IJR?
2) When BJW measures are combined with participants’ physiological arousal
measures, how much predictive power does each variable add when predicting
IJR?
3) Do BJW measures correlate with the amount of physiological arousal experienced
by individuals exposed to justice-threat provoking stimuli?
These hypotheses were designed to explore the ways in which emotions might be related
to an individual's development of a BJW. Moreover, they attempt to gather information
concerning the predictive power that BJW measures and physiological arousal measures possess
with regard to how individuals respond to justice-threats.
Investigation of Callan, Ellard, and Nicol's (2006) and Tomaka and Blascovich’s (1994)
Experiments
The next hypotheses were formulated to test Callan, Ellard, and Nicol's (2006), and
Tomaka, and Blascovich’s (1994) original findings. If an outcome is perceived as deserved,
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were individuals more likely to exhibit IJR when provoked to do so by justice-threat provoking
stimuli? Additionally, could levels of physiological arousal experienced in individuals under
stressful situations be predicted by measures of BJW?
1) When the outcome is perceived as deserved, there is a greater chance that
individuals will exhibit IJR when provoked by justice-threat provoking stimuli.
2) Individuals who experience greater stress during the arithmetic stress task are
more likely to score higher on BJW measures.
These hypotheses were designed to explore the replication of Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s
(2006), and Tomaka and Blascovich’s (1994) experiments.
Emotional Arousal and Just-World Research
The third group of hypotheses dealt with the usefulness of physiological measures in the
paradigm of just-world theory research. Were measures of physiological arousal a significant
predictor of IJR? Was the emotional arousal caused by justice-threats assessed using
physiological arousal indicators?
1) Does an individual's physiological arousal have predictive power towards his/her
likelihood of exhibiting IJR?
2) Does a significant difference exist between the amount of physiological arousal
individuals exhibit when the outcome is or is not perceived as deserved?
These hypotheses were designed to ask directly whether measures of physiological
arousal could predict IJR.
The Utility of Open-Ended Responses
The fourth set of questions addressed the usefulness of obtaining participants’ openended explanations for their behavior. Open-ended comments were categorized into defensive
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strategy classes. When individuals were grouped into defensive strategy classes using their
open-ended explanations, were there any differences in the amount of emotional arousal
exhibited between groups? In addition, when grouped by defensive strategy class, were there
any differences in a group's BJW measures and IJR when compared to other groups? When
comparing justice-threat provoking – adulterous and non-adulterous – conditions were there
differences in the frequencies of defensive strategy classes reported between conditions?
1) Once participants are grouped by defensive strategy class, does the presence of
justice-threat provoking stimuli elicit significantly different physiological arousal
responses between groups?
2) Once participants are grouped by defensive strategy class, are there significant
differences regarding self-report BJW scores between groups?
3) When comparing adulterous and non-adulterous conditions, do defensive strategy
class frequency distributions differ significantly?
These hypotheses were designed to provide insight as to the usefulness of individuals’
explanations for their behaviors. We endeavored to discern if any particular defensive strategy
class chosen by participants could be predicted using experimental variables.
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Method

Participants
109 undergraduate students enrolled in one or more psychology courses at Eastern
Michigan University (31 men, 65 women; Mage = 32.0, SDage = 8.16 years, age range: 18 - 60
years) participated in this study. Eight of the participants were married, 80 were single, 7 were
in a domestic partnership, and 1 was divorced. The ethnicity of the sample included 58
Caucasian, 24 African-American, 4 Asian, 5 Hispanic, and 5 Other individuals. The economic
status of the participants included 21 lower class, 69 middle class, and 6 upper class individuals.
Out of the 109 participants, 5 pilot participants had experimental data which was removed, and 2
additional participants’ data had been lost – one because of a fire alarm and the other because of
a computer crash. Out of the 109 participants, 12 participants had survey results that were not
retrieved because of inexact matching of age and/or survey participation reported time for
retrieval.
Apparatus
The participants’ electrodermal conductivity and heart rate were obtained with the use of
an IOM Model HR001.1 physiological monitor. Raw measurements of Galvanic skin response
(GSR) and pulse pressure were taken throughout the experiment at 31.25 Hz, and then text files
were saved using open-source Lightstone software v0.7. Participants’ raw data was then
encoded a using physiological grading algorithm as shown in Appendix H. Time intervals were
sectioned and scored with regard to E-Prime condition event time-stamps in order to obtain base
rate physiological average responses over the critical experimental stimuli.
A computer with 21-inch flat screen monitor and mouse was used for stimuli
presentation. E-Prime was used to record response behaviors/answers. Each participant had a
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blank piece of paper with numbered boxes taped to the table in front of them. They were also
provided with a pen connected to the monitor by a string. All experimentation was conducted in
the same climate and sound controlled room, isolated from interferences.
Procedure
Recruitment and pre-assessment. Participants were recruited from general psychology
laboratory courses using the online Sona systems signup web application, and public psychology
billboard announcements. Participants were offered extra credit for their participation.
Participants were contacted through email to setup an appointment for the experiment.
Participants were instructed to take a short preliminary survey online through Survey Monkey
prior to their experiment appointment. This survey consisted of Lipkus’s (1991) Global Belief in
a Just-world Scale (GBJWS) as well as demographic questions. A brief informed consent was
administered before Lipkus’s measure. In addition, a variation on the Wilson-Patterson c-scale
method (Wilson, Patterson, 1968) was used, implementing Henningham’s (1995) 12-item scale
modification. No private identifying information was obtained, and survey results were linked to
experimental data by the participants’ report of their age and time/data of survey participation.
Initial briefing and setup. When participants arrived for their scheduled appointment
they completed another informed consent. This version included subsequent details regarding
the physiological aspects of the experiment. Participants were told that they were participating
in an experiment designed to investigate the “emotional arousal of media sources.” They were
briefed that different forms of media articles (e.g. News article, Advertisements, Science Blog)
were to be shown to them through a computer medium, and that they would be asked their
opinions about the information contained in the articles. In addition to their survey answers, they
were told that we were obtaining their physiological measures in order to gain a sense of their
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emotions. Participants were told that two response methods would be used. First, by mouse
clicked selections of answer boxes. Second, by written answers on the piece of paper taped in
front of them. The participants were told that the whole survey should take less than a half hour
(this was a correct estimate).
The physiological apparatus was connected to participants. This consisted of a hand
apparatus, which measured fluctuations in electrodermal response and heart rate (connected to
the non-dominate hand). Once participants verified that they did not have an allergy or
sensitivity to alcohol swabs, they were asked to use disposable alcohol swabs to clean the
surfaces of their fingertips in order to confirm a good connection to the device. The finger
connectors were placed on the participants’ fingertips by the experimenter. These finger
connectors were held fast by snug spring loaded shutters. Once the device was connected to the
participants’ hand, participants were instructed to rest their arm upon a pre-made cushion in the
most comfortable means possible, and instructed to keep their hand and fingers as still as
possible throughout the entirety of the experiment. The apparatus was then checked for
functionality, calibrated, and set to record continually through the experiment. As prescribed by
Blascovish and Kelsey (1990), a brief inventory of yes/no questions was asked through the
computer medium with regard to caffeine consumption, and possible mood stabilizing and
cardiac drugs that stabilize heart rate currently being used by participants. Participants could
refuse to participate in the experiment by declining that any particular physiological assessment
apparatus be attached to their bodies, or if participants could not participate in the experiment as
a result of being blind or missing a hand, a participant would have been thanked for their
participation and awarded their extra credit, however, none declined.
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Baseline phase. The next phase was designed to replicate Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s
(2006) experiment. As per Callan, Ellard, and Nicol, a “filler task” was used to facilitate the
believability of the cover story. This consisted of a replication magazine aid, which reported the
recent medical information about coffee consumption. Contrary to Callan, Ellard, and Nicol, the
magazine article was presented though a computer screen medium as if the magazine material
were scanned from paper copies. The Callan, Ellard, and Nicol, baseline stimulus has been
provided in Appendix B. The magazine clippings had a time paced advancement at 180 words
per minute, and periodically showed pictures associated with the scanned clippings adjacent to
the text of the articles. The filler task phase served as the first physiological baseline measure as
suggested by Blascovish and Kelsey (1990), and Tomaka and Blascovich (1994). Therefore, the
first media filler task took participants about 6 minutes to complete. At the end of the filler task,
filler questions were asked about the material such as, “How informative was this article?”
(Rated from 1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree) and, “Did you understand what this article
was talking about?” (Rated from 1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree). These questions were
designed to support the cover story, and to habituate participants to responding to questions. In
addition to information type questions, questions involving the emotionality of the articles were
asked, such as, “To what extent did you find this article emotionally involving?” (Callan,
Sutton, & Dovale, 2010). This was done in order to prime emotional processes, and support the
cover story. Answers were made with the participants’ free dominant hand using a mouse-click
interface. Short answer questions were also asked which required participants to use a pen to
answer. An example of a short answer question was, “How might this article change the way
you use caffeine?” Participants were then prompted to write their answers on numbered lines on
the sheet in front of them. In order to obtain a stable baseline, multiple filler tasks were
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implemented such as a “Find Findrick” (similar to “Where’s Waldo?”) screen game during
which the participants were asked to relax, take their time, and browse the page for Findrick for a
few minutes. The date and time of each stimulus slide was continually recorded in order to track
parallel physiological events.
Experimental phase. Next, the experimental phase began. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of two conditions. A cover story was presented under the guise of a newspaper
article. Stimuli were presented in the form of clippings of a scanned newspaper and presented to
participants. As in Callan, Ellard, and Nicol (2006), the stimulus was an article entitled “David’s
story” and consisted of the events pertaining to David (as described in the literature review
section of this thesis). As in Callan, Ellard, and Nicol, participants were exposed to the events
pertaining to David. In addition to Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s narrative of David’s misfortune,
pictures were added for participants to view, which directly pertained to the story at hand. These
pictures were of emergency medical technicians on the scene. No pictures of graphic injuries
were shown, but the pictures implied that a person was very badly harmed. As they continued
on, participants read narrative information that supported the two different character
representations of David. One condition was of an adulterous husband who was hit by a car (i.e.
adulterous, justice valance condition) and the other condition was of a non-adulterous husband
who was hit by a car (i.e. non-adulterous, unjust valance condition). Participants then answered
a few filler questions that pertained to facts presented in the article, and the main dependent
justice related questions. An example of a filler question is, “How likely is it that you could be
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in the same accident as David?”2 (rated from 1 Not likely at all to 7 A great deal likely). Exact
stimuli are present in Appendices C and D.
Immanent justice reasoning just valence condition: adulterous condition. The first
condition consisted of a replication of the experiment described in Callan, Ellard, and Nicol's
(2006) study (Study 1), although stimulus introduction was shifted from a paper medium to a
computer medium. This scenario was designed in order to elicit the JMB of immanent justice
reasoning (IJR). In both conditions, participants were exposed to the standard article information
that detailed the events of David’s car accident. The second part of the stimulus detailed
testimony from the people who knew David personally. In these testimonials, David was
reported to be a morally repugnant individual who was engaging in an adulterous affair with a
woman named Susanne – his travel agent. Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s adulterous condition
stimulus has been provided in Appendix C. In Callan, Ellard, and Nicol, participants were more
likely to endorse an IJR response by responding to the question “To what extent do you feel
David’s accident was the result of his dealings with Susanne?” (rated from 1 - not at all to 7 - a
great deal) with answers other than one. Participants in the 2006 study were more likely to
assert that there was a causal relationship between David’s accident and his dealings with
Susanne than in the non-adulterous condition.
Immanent justice reasoning unjust valence condition: non-adulterous condition.
The second condition consisted of a nearly exact replication of the condition described in Callan,
Ellard, and Nicol’s (2006) study, although stimulus introduction was shifted from a paper

2

While many filler questions are interesting in their own right, because of time and

space limitations, their investigations are not contained by the scope of this document.
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medium to a computer medium. This scenario was not designed to elicit the JMB of IJR, but
participants were still able to endorse a causal relationship between the two events because of
justice-threat provoking arousal. The participants were exposed to the standardized article
information that detailed the events of David’s car accident. The second part of the stimulus
detailed testimony from the people who knew David personally. In these testimonials, David
was reported to be a morally virtuous individual who was planning a vacation for his family with
a woman named Susanne – his travel agent. Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s non-adulterous condition
stimulus has been provided in Appendix D. In the Callan, Ellard, and Nicol study, experimental
participants were less likely to provide an immanent justice response by responding to the
question “To what extent do you feel David’s accident was the result of his dealings with
Susanne?” (rated from 1- not at all, to 7 - a great deal) with the usual answer of one. In the
2006 study participants were less likely to assert that there was a causal relationship between
David’s accident and his dealings with Susanne than in the adulterous condition.
Secondary questions. Secondary questions were mixed into the dependent measure
questions. For example, “To what extent did you find this article emotionally involving?” rated
from 1 (not at all emotionally involving) to 7 (a great deal emotionally involving). These were
an assortment of questions selected to determine the explicit effect of the stimulus on selfreported affect.3 Additionally, other questions were asked as to David’s deservedness of his

3

The author also acknowledges that the integrity of the explicit affective self-report

assessment is in some way psychometrically compromised because of the temporal
distance between the actual affect-inducing stimuli and the affect assessment itself.
Nevertheless, techniques of explicit affective self-report measures may still be used. The
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misfortune, and global questions pertaining to the likelihood that misfortune befalls individuals
like David (Details in Appendix I).
Open-ended question. Following the exposure of the affective questions and Likert IJR
questions, an open-ended question was administered in order to determine participants’ beliefs
about the nature of the causal linkage between the two events. The open-ended question was
identical for both the adulterous and non-adulterous conditions. Because the galvanic skin
device immobilized one of participants’ hands, participants were asked to use their free dominant
hand to write an answer. The question was, “Do you think there is a relationship between
David’s car accident, and his dealings with Susanne, and why? Please explain your thoughts in
detail.” as per Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s (2006) experiment. When the participants wrote their
statement, the action was mechanically identical to the filler task in the baseline condition. All
participants’ answers were categorized using Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s (2006) qualitative rubric
by division of all answers into classes of answers outlined as follows:
(a) chance, coincidence, fluke, random; (b) fate, predestined but no mention of justice,
punishment, or reward; (c) justice, punishment, reward, karma, justice maxims (e.g.,
“what goes around comes around”); (d) naturalistic-incomplete: mention of naturally
occurring processes, including psychological states (e.g., victim was distracted) but that
do not connect initial deeds to the final good or bad outcome; (e) naturalistic complete:
any explanatory account relying on naturalistic processes (nonsupernatural) that connect

reader may note that emotional affective questions pertaining to the stimuli should be
expected by the participant, due in part, by the emphasis of the cover story and to
emotional affective questions pertaining to the first baseline (or filler) activity.
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the initial deeds with the final good or bad outcome; and (f) other. (Callan, Ellard, &
Nicol, 2006, p. 1654)
For example, if participants stated that they felt David’s accident was completely due to chance,
and that there was no way to predict such an incident, the participants’ response would be
categorized as (a) chance. If participants stated that they think David was fated to be hit by the
car, or that God put the events of David’s accident in motion this would be categorized as (b)
fate or ultimate justice. If participants stated that David “deserved” it and justice was served, this
would be categorized as (c) justice. If participants stated that something about David’s dealings
with Susanne caused that accident, but they were not sure exactly how or were vague, this would
be categorized as (d) naturalistic incomplete. If participants stated that David’s lack of attention
was because of stress in his life and caused his inattention, this would result in a categorization
of (e) naturalistic complete, or (naturalistic causal rationalization). Interestingly, only DSCs
(a), (b), and (e) were ever selected by participants in the present study.
Once participants completed the experiment, the responses were coded by two research
assistants. The second research assistant was recruited in order to reassess all qualitative
categorizations independently, in order to control for grammatical misinterpretation, and
ambiguity of some participant responses. Results were compared in order to maintain inter-rater
reliability and to assess the systematic viability of the coding process.
Cognitive load condition. A second rest period with a “Find Findrick” screen was
presented. Then, as in Tomaka and Blascovich’s (1994) study, all participants underwent a 4minute difficult task that was implemented after the main condition questions. In keeping with
Tomaka and Blascovich (1994), participants were instructed to perform serial subtraction as
rapidly as possible from the number 2,549 by intervals of seven as quickly and as accurately as
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they were able for 4 minutes. Answers were typed using a number pad, and a readout display
was shown to participants as they progressed. In addition, participants were prompted to speed
up (by text box) randomly during the 4 minutes. Moreover, information was displayed with
regard to whether participants were slowing down or speeding up their calculation pace (by text
box). As in Tomaka and Blascovich’s (1994), participants were asked a few questions about
how difficult they felt the counting task was.
This condition was designed to induce a mildly stressful situation. This served two
purposes: (1) Emotional arousal has been shown to be expressed differently through
physiological measures per individual (Levenson et al., 1992). By measuring how participants
reacted on a task that was designed to raise heart rate (HR) and skin conductance (SC),
individual response profiles were determined. This gave the experimenter a more acute
assessment of physiological arousal. (2) In addition, overall physiological responses at a peak
level were combined with baseline values in order to give the experimenter a percentage value
(i.e. between low baseline, and peak cognitive load) for participants’ emotional response
throughout the experiment. This particular type of assessment could only be performed,
however, if peak physiological measures were not correlated with IJR scores. This created a
statistical confound that neutralized any observable physiological response due to justice-threat
arousal. Unfortunately, participants’ peak levels were correlated with their IJR score, thus
creating this confound.
Measures
Preliminary individual difference assessments. All participants were instructed to take
a preliminary survey. First, Lipkus (1991) Global Belief in a Just-world Scale (GBJWS) was
completed (Appendix F), followed by demographic information. Demographics obtained were
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participants’ age, relationship status, ethnicity, and economic status of the rearing household. In
addition, a variation on the Wilson-Patterson C-scale method (Wilson, Patterson, 1968) was
solicited, implementing Henningham’s (1995) 12-item scale measurement (Appendix E).
Dependent measure questions. Please see Appendix I for a complete table of all
dependent measure questions. Each question was introduced individually in accordance with the
order presented in Appendix I. Beneath each question, seven labeled buttons were presented. If
the participants failed to respond to an item in fifteen seconds of the question’s initial exposure, a
prompt requested participants to make a selection.
Two baseline measures and five experimental measures were computed. In the baseline
condition, causal judgment was the sum composite of questions 3, 4, and 7, and affect was the
sum composite of questions 2, 6, and 8. In the experimental condition, the IJR score was based
on question 2, which was the principle dependent measure of Callan, Ellard, and Nicol (2006,
Study 1). Continuing in the experimental condition, the composite affect was based on the sum
composite questions 1, 3 and reverse 6. Composite deserved was a sum composite of questions 4
and reverse 5, whereas Composite causal was a sum composite of 2, 8, 9, and 13. Lastly, a
principal component emotionality factor was derived from a direct Oblimin rotation of questions
1, 3, and 6. All variable correlations, coefficients, and Cronbach’s αs have been reported in
Table 1 (across adulterous and non-adulterous conditions), Table 2 (adulterous condition), and
Table 3 (non-adulterous condition).
Physiological Measures
Physiological measures were taken continually throughout the experiment. Physiological
measures were primarily a reflection of sympathetic nervous system (SNS), and parasympathetic
nervous system (PNS) activity. All physiological measures were compared to baseline values,
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and were understood to be physiological difference measures between baseline averages and
experimental condition averages. SNS and PNS have been generally believed to be close
indicators of physiological arousal (Blascovich & Kelsey, 1990; Blascovich, 2000):


Skin Conductance (SC) is primarily a measure of SNS activation. SC is also known as
galvanic skin response (GSR). This was detected by the voltage level change across two
finger leads while constant undetectable electric current was passed though the fingers.



Heart rate (HR) is primarily a measure of PNS activation, but is also effected by SNS
activation. It was measured by the frequency of ventricular contraction peaks and is
typically represented in the form of ventricular contractions per minute or beats per
minute (BPM).
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Results

Regarding Belief in a Just-World Measures
Using the global belief in a just-world scale to predict immanent justice reasoning.
The first class of hypotheses dealt with the question of what role self-report assessments of belief
in just-world (BJW) play in predicting different justice motivated behaviors (JMB). These
analyses focused on whether BJW self-report assessments have predictive power with regard to
JMBs like immanent justice reasoning (IJR). In order to answer the question, “Do BJW
measures correlate with the JMBs?” three Pearson product-moment correlation comparisons
were conducted (see Tables 1, 2, and 3 for full details). These compare participants’ dependent
measures IJR question score (See Appendix I, Experimental Condition, Question 2) with their
Global Belief in a Just-World Scale (GBJWS) score for conditions IJR adulterous and IJR nonadulterous individually, and across both conditions. The GBJWS assessment and JMB of IJR
score for the adulterous David condition were not found to correlate (r(61) = -0.004, p > 0.05;
see Table 2). The GBJWS assessment and JMB of IJR score for the non-adulterous David
condition were not found to correlate (r(35) = -0.229, p > 0.05; see Table 3). The GBJWS
assessment and JMB of IJR score across the adulterous and non-adulterous conditions were not
found to correlate either (r(96) = -0.033, p > 0.05; see Table 1). This data suggests that GBJWS
scores are a poor predictor of IJR score. Additionally, the measure composite IJR was
investigated. Composite IJR was calculated as having a Cronbach’s α equal to 0.60, which is
inadequate and therefore led to its rejection as a useful measure. Regardless, no significant
correlations between GBJWS assessment and the composite IJR were found.
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Table 1
Across conditions Pearson correlation matrix, means, standard deviations, and reliability analyses for study variables
N

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.

Age (years)

95

23.02

8.17

2.

SES

96

4.54

1.65

-.21*

3.

GJWBS

96

22.18

4.4

.04

-.20

[.73]

4.

SCS:Total

96

5.31

2.8

-.18

.08

-.12

[.71]

5.

SCS:Sex

96

2.10

1.4

-.19

.06

-.08

.83**

[.47]

6.

Emotion PCR

109

0.00

1.00

-.10

-.10

.05

.14

.17

7.

Affective

109

15.28

3.4

-.24*

.22*

-.09

.27**

.36**

.42**

[.65]

8.

IJR Score

109

2.87

2.0

.00

-.01

-.03

.16

.17

.37**

.42**

9.

Causal

109

12.06

4.7

-.12

-.07

-.09

.22*

.24*

.42**

.43**

.71**

[.60]

10.

Deserved

109

7.04

3.3

-.12

-.08

.01

.18

.21*

.98**

.49**

.47**

.51**

[.76]

11.

AT Perform.

108

28.62

16.4

.02

.23*

-.11

-.06

.10

.04

.03

-.12

-.12

.02

12.

IJR:GSR

102

0.59

0.64

-.03

.09

-.12

-.02

.02

-.06

-.05

.12

.07

-.04

.16

13.

IJR:BPM

102

-3.16

3.1

.23*

-.35**

.00

-.23*

-.21*

.11

-.10

-.08

-.04

.08

.00

.16

14.

AT:GSR

102

0.56

0.50

-.13

.15

.15

-.12

-.01

-.05

-.03

-.17

-.09

-.06

.11

.02

13

14

-.01

15. AT:BPM
102 1.46
4.5 -.07
-.08
.28** -.01
-.03
.00
-.04
-.04
-.08
-.02 .05
-.07 .05
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level – 2-tailed. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level – 2-tailed. [ ]. Cronbach's α reliability score.

.22*

SES = socio-economic status; GJWBS = Global Just World Belief Scale; SCS:Total = Total Social Conservatism Scale; SCS:Sex = Sex Social
Conservatism Scale; Emotion PCR = principle component reduction of the affective emotionality questions; Affective = composite score of affective
questions (items 1, 3, and reverse 6); IJR score = immanent justice reasoning question (item 2); Causal = composite score of causal questions (items 2, 8, 9,
and 13);Deserved = composite score of deserved questions (items 4, and Reverse 5); AT Perform. = completed subtraction trials during arithmetic task
performance; IJR:GSR = galvanic skin response during immanent justice reasoning phase (changed from baseline); IJR:BPM = beats per minute during
immanent justice reasoning phase (changed from baseline); AT:GRS = galvanic skin response during arithmetic task phase (changed from baseline);
AT:BPM = beats per minute during arithmetic Task phase (changed from baseline);
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Table 2
Adulterous condition Pearson correlation matrix, means, standard deviations, and reliability analyses for study variables
N

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

1.

Age (years)

60

22.87

7.8

2.

SES

61

4.43

1.7

-.10

3.

GJWBS

61

22.64

4.0

-.05

-.23

[.69]

4.

SCS:Total

61

5.44

3.0

-.13

-.01

-.05

[.76]

5.

SCS:Sex

61

2.25

1.4

-.12

.00

-.05

.86**

[.62]

6.

Emotion PCR

69

0.60

0.69

-.22

.05

-.25

.25

.18

7.

Affective

69

16.07

3.4

-.16

.32

*

.00

.25

*

.33*

6

7

8

.42**

[.71]

**

.36**

9

10

8.

IJR Score

69

3.28

2.0

.13

.01

.00

.20

.09

.36

9.

Causal

69

12.93

4.9

-.09

-.13

-.11

.23

.15

.47**

.37**

.73**

[.62]

-.22

.28

*

.21

.98

**

**

**

.57**

[.58]

-.12

-.05

.03

-.10

-.09

-.20

-.22

-.12

10.

Deserved

69

8.91

2.6

-.20

.05
*

.48

.47

11

12

11.

AT Perform.

68

30.06

13

.03

.31

12.

IJR:GSR

64

0.60

0.63

-.09

.11

-.04

.13

.10

-.14

-.18

-.03

.02

-.12

.10

13.

IJR:BPM

64

-2.88

2.9

.07

-.25

.08

-.17

-.13

.00

-.16

-.17

-.03

-.04

.05

.13

14.

AT:GSR

64

0.52

0.45

-.02

.23

.06

-.04

.11

.02

.11

-.22

-.16

.01

.19

.11

13

14

.18

*

15. AT:BPM
64 1.64
4.9 -.05 -.11 .32
-.01 -.02 -.12 -.04 -.01 -.07 -.11 .13
.07
.03
.28*
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level – 2-tailed. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level – 2-tailed. [ ]. Cronbach's α reliability score.
SES = socio-economic status; GJWBS = Global Just World Belief Scale; SCS:Total = Total Social Conservatism Scale; SCS:Sex = Sex Social
Conservatism Scale; Emotion PCR = principle component reduction of the affective emotionality questions; Affective = composite score of
affective questions (items 1, 3, and reverse 6); IJR score = immanent justice reasoning question (item 2); Causal = composite score of causal
questions (items 2, 8, 9, and 13);Deserved = composite score of deserved questions (items 4, and Reverse 5); AT Perform. = completed subtraction
trials during arithmetic task performance; IJR:GSR = galvanic skin response during immanent justice reasoning phase (changed from baseline);
IJR:BPM = beats per minute during immanent justice reasoning phase (changed from baseline); AT:GRS = galvanic skin response during
arithmetic task phase (changed from baseline); AT:BPM = beats per minute during arithmetic Task phase (changed from baseline);
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Table 3
Non-adulterous condition Pearson correlation matrix, means, standard deviations, and reliability analyses for study variables
N

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.

Age (years)

95

23.02

8.17

2.

SES

96

4.54

1.65

-.21*

3.

GJWBS

96

22.18

4.4

.04

-.20

[.73]

4.

SCS:Total

96

5.31

2.8

-.18

.08

-.12

[.71]

5.

SCS:Sex

96

2.10

1.4

-.19

.06

-.08

.83**

[.47]

6.

Emotion PCR

109

0.00

1.00

-.10

-.10

.05

.14

.17

7.

Affective

109

15.28

3.4

-.24*

.22*

-.09

.27**

.36**

.42**

[.65]

8.

IJR Score

109

2.87

2.0

.00

-.01

-.03

.16

.17

.37**

.42**

9.

Causal

109

12.06

4.7

-.12

-.07

-.09

.22*

.24*

.42**

.43**

.71**

[.60]

10.

Deserved

109

7.04

3.3

-.12

-.08

.01

.18

.21*

.98**

.49**

.47**

.51**

[.76]

11.

AT Perform.

108

28.62

16.4

.02

.23*

-.11

-.06

.10

.04

.03

-.12

-.12

.02

12.

IJR:GSR

102

0.59

0.64

-.03

.09

-.12

-.02

.02

-.06

-.05

.12

.07

-.04

.16

13.

IJR:BPM

102

-3.16

3.1

.23*

-.35**

.00

-.23*

-.21*

.11

-.10

-.08

-.04

.08

.00

.16

14.

AT:GSR

102

0.56

0.50

-.13

.15

.15

-.12

-.01

-.05

-.03

-.17

-.09

-.06

.11

.02

13

14

-.01

15. AT:BPM
102 1.46
4.5 -.07
-.08
.28** -.01
-.03
.00
-.04
-.04
-.08
-.02 .05
-.07 .05
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level – 2-tailed. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level – 2-tailed. [ ]. Cronbach's α reliability score.

.22*

SES = socio-economic status; GJWBS = Global Just World Belief Scale; SCS:Total = Total Social Conservatism Scale; SCS:Sex = Sex Social
Conservatism Scale; Emotion PCR = principle component reduction of the affective emotionality questions; Affective = composite score of affective
questions (items 1, 3, and reverse 6); IJR score = immanent justice reasoning question (item 2); Causal = composite score of causal questions (items 2, 8, 9,
and 13);Deserved = composite score of deserved questions (items 4, and Reverse 5); AT Perform. = completed subtraction trials during arithmetic task
performance; IJR:GSR = galvanic skin response during immanent justice reasoning phase (changed from baseline); IJR:BPM = beats per minute during
immanent justice reasoning phase (changed from baseline); AT:GRS = galvanic skin response during arithmetic task phase (changed from baseline);
AT:BPM = beats per minute during arithmetic Task phase (changed from baseline);
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Using the global belief in a just-world scale and physiological arousal to predict
immanent justice reasoning. The next set of analyses focused on whether the GBJWS measure
was a significant predictor of JMBs like IJR when emotional arousal was added as a predictor.
How much predictive power was added by physiological indicators of emotional arousal
(possibly induced by justice-threat provoking stimuli)? When BJW measures were combined
with individuals' measures of physiological arousal, how much predictive power did each add in
predicting JMBs?
In order to answer these questions, a hierarchical linear regression was used for each
condition: IJR adulterous, IJR non-adulterous. Each condition’s hierarchical linear regression
consists of a regression analysis comparing the JMB and GBJWS for each condition as the first
level of the analysis. The second level of the analysis consists of a comparison between the JMB
and GBJWS for each condition, but with the addition of the physiological measures of skin
conductance (SC) and heart rate (HR) change, compared to baseline response. A hierarchical
regression analysis was conducted on the adulterous condition to test if physiological measures
of SC and HR were significant predictors of IJR in addition to the GBJWS measure. Results of
our hierarchical regression indicate that the GBJWS is not a significant predictor of IJR (F(1,54)
= 0.225, p > 0.05, R2 = 0.004). Furthermore, the addition of physiological measures of SC and
HR were not significant predictors (F(3,52) = 0.596, p > 0.05, R2 = 0.033) and did not add
anything significant to the model (see Table 4). There was not a significant increase in variance
accounted for by the addition of physiological measures (ΔF(2,52) = 0.782, p > 0.05, ΔR2 =
0.029; see Table 4).
Additionally, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted on the non-adulterous
condition to test if physiological measures of SC and HR were significant predictors of IJR in
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addition to the GBJWS measure. The results of our hierarchical regression indicate that the
GBJWS alone is not a significant predictor of IJR (F(1,31) = 0.989, p > 0.05, R2 = 0.031). After
adding the physiological measures of SC and HR then full model is significant, predicting 34.6%
of the variance (F(3,29) = 5.119, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.346). There is also a significant increase in
variance accounted for by the addition of physiological measures (ΔF(2,29) = 6.993, p < 0.01,
ΔR2 = 0.315; see Table 4).
Table 4
Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Predicting Immanent Justice Reasoning Scores from
GBJWS and Physiological Measures
Condition
Predictor
Std.Beta
p
R
Adj. R2 ΔR2
ΔF
p
Adulterous Step 1: GBJWS
-0.064
0.64
0.064 -0.014 0.00 0.225 >.05
Step 2: GBJWS
-0.052
0.71
0.182 -0.023 0.03 0.782 >.05
GSR.C.BL
-0.011
0.94
BPM.C.BL
-0.169
0.23
NonAdulterous

Step 1: GBJWS
-0.176
0.33
0.176 0.000 0.03 0.989 >.05
Step 2: GBJWS
-0.086
0.59
0.588 0.279 0.32 6.993 <.01
GSR.C.BL
0.536
<.01
BPM.C.BL
-0.310
0.05
GBJWS = Global Belief Just World Scale; GSR.C.BL = Skin Conductance/Galvanic Skin
Response from Change Baseline; BPM.C.BL = Heart Rate/Beats per Minute Change from
Baseline
Using the global belief in a just-world scale to predict physiological arousal. The
next set of analyses focused on whether there was a relationship with regard to an individual's
scores on the GBJWS assessment, and how emotionally arousing individuals found justicethreats. Did BJW measures correlate with the amount of physiological arousal experienced by
individuals exposed to justice-threat provoking stimuli? In order to answer this question, a
multiple linear regression was performed for each of the two conditions: adulterous and nonadulterous (see Table 5). Both multiple linear regressions compared individuals’ GBJWS and
their changed average physiological measure of skin conductance (SC) and heart rate (HR) from
baseline, in response to justice-threat provoking stimuli. A multiple linear regression analysis

PSYSIOLOGICAL REASONING

47

was conducted to test if the changed physiological measures of SC and HR, induced by justicethreat provoking stimuli, were significant predictors of an individual’s score on a GBJWS
assessment (see Table 5). In the adulterous condition, physiological measures are not significant
predictors of GBJWS scores (F(2,53) = 0.226, p > 0.05, R2 = 0.008). Additionally, in the nonadulterous condition, physiological measures are not significant predictors of a GBJWS scores
(F(2,30) = 1.026, p > 0.05, R2 = 0.064).
Table 5
Multiple Regression Analysis: Predicting Global Belief in a Just World from Physiological
Measures due to Arousal During Experimental Phase
Condition
Predictor
Std.Beta
p
R
R2
Adj. R2
F
p
Adulterous Full Model
0.64 0.064 -0.014
0.00
0.225 >.05
Var 1: GSR.C.BL
-0.011
0.94
Var 2: BPM.C.BL -0.169
0.23
NonAdulterous

Full Model
0.33 0.176 0.000
0.03
0.989 >.05
Var 1: GSR.C.BL
0.536
<.01
Var 2: BPM.C.BL -0.310
0.05
GBJWS = Global Belief Just World Scale; GSR.C.BL = Skin Conductance/Galvanic Skin
Response from Change Baseline; BPM.C.BL = Heart Rate/Beats per Minute Change from
Baseline

Investigation of Previous Experiments
Support for Callan, Ellard, and Nicol (2006). The next analysis confirmed the
hypotheses of Callan, Ellard, and Nicol's (2006) original study, and Blascovich and Kelsey’s
(1994) BJW cognitive load study. Following Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s original study, this
analysis investigated whether individuals were more likely to use IJR when presented with
justice-threat provoking stimuli. Was there a greater chance that individuals would use IJR when
provoked by justice-threat provoking stimuli? A Student’s t-test mean comparison was used to
compare JMB in the experimental conditions: adulterous and non-adulterous. Individuals who
were exposed to David’s adulterous condition (M = 2.18, SD = 1.66, n = 40) are significantly
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more likely (Welch’s t(95.29) = -3.057, p < 0 .01, Welch’s r2 = 0.089) to report a causal
relationship between the events of David’s accident and his dealings with Susanne than nonadulterous condition participants (M = 3.28, SD = 2.043, n = 69; see Figure 1). Levene’s test for
equality of variances was found to be violated for the present analysis (F(1,107) = 6.142, p <
0.05). Because of this violated assumption, and the unevenness of the sample sizes, a t statistic –
that did not assume homogeneity of variance – was computed. The results of our analysis repeat
Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s original findings.

Figure 1. Immanent Justice Reasoning Scores compared between Experimental Conditions.
95% confidence intervals are represented in the figure by the error bars attached to each column.
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Support for Tomaka and Blascovich (1994). The next analysis confirmed Tomaka and
Blascovich’s (1994) belief in a just world cognitive load study. Tomaka and Blascovich’s
original experiment asked the question, “Is there a relationship between the levels of reported
just-world belief an individual purports, and the level of stress they experience in a stressful
situation?” (i.e. mathematical stress task). A multiple linear regression analysis was used. The
analysis compares participants’ ratings on the GBJWS measure and their physiological arousal,
induced by a repetitive subtraction task, as changed from game 2 baseline. The full model using
both physiological predictors is statistically significant, but only accounts for 8.5% of the
variance in the GBJWS measure (F(2,86) = 4.002, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.085; see Table 6).
Table 6
Multiple Regression Analysis: Predicting Global Belief in a Just World from Physiological
Measures due to Arithmetic Stress Task
Condition Predictor
Std.Beta
p
R
R2
Adj. R2
F
p
Arithmetic Full Model
0.022 0.292 0.085
0.064
4.002 <.05
Stress
Var 1: BPM.C.BL
0.259
0.017 0.279
Var 2: GSR.C.BL
0.087
0.417 0.147
GBJWS = Global Belief Just World Scale; GSR.C.BL = Skin Conductance/Galvanic Skin
Response from Change Baseline; BPM.C.BL = Heart Rate/Beats per Minute Change from
Baseline
Results show that only the change in HR was a significant predictor of GBJWS (p < 0.05;
see Table 1). These results support the original findings of Tomaka and Blascovich (1994), even
though this experiment’s baseline task period was dropped to be approximately one-third the
original experiment’s 15-minute baseline period.
Emotional Arousal and Just-World Research
The third hypothesis group dealt with the usefulness of physiological measures in the
paradigm of just-world theory research. These analyses address whether physiological measures
alone were a significant predictor of JMBs. That is, did an individual’s physiological arousal

PSYSIOLOGICAL REASONING

50

have predictive power towards their likelihood of exhibiting JMBs? In order to answer this
inquiry, a multiple linear regression was used in the non-adulterous and adulterous experimental
condition. This was to test if the change from baseline physiological measures, SC and HR
induced by justice-threat provoking stimuli, were significant predictors of individuals JMB of
IJR scores.
Using physiological arousal to predict immanent justice reasoning. A multiple linear
regression analysis was used to develop a model for predicting participants’ use of IJR based on
participants’ physiological responses of HR and SC during justice-threat arousal stimuli
compared to baseline measurements. Basic descriptive statistics and regression coefficients are
shown in Table 7 for both the adulterous and non-adulterous conditions, respectively. In the
adulterous condition, neither SC nor HR are significant predictors of IJR. The full model using
both physiological predictors are also not significant predictors of IJR scores (F(2,61) = 0.950, p
> 0.05, R2 = 0.030). In the non-adulterous condition, however, SC is a significant predictor of
IJR (p < 0.05). Additionally, the full model using both physiological predictors is statistically
significant and accounts for 16% of the variance (F(2,35) = 3.42, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.163). These
results suggest that emotional arousal, as shown though physiological measures, is a predictive
component of individual likelihood to endorse an IJR causal relationship between two events
only during the presence of justice-threat provoking stimuli.
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Table 7
Multiple Regression Analysis: Predicting Immanent Justice Reasoning Scores
from Physiological Measures
Condition Predictor
Std.Beta
p
R
R2
Adj. R2
F
p
Adulterous
Full Model
0.392 0.174 0.030 -0.002 0.950 >.05
Var 1: BPM.C.BL -0.173 0.178 -0.174
Var 2: GSR.C.BL
-0.004 0.977 -0.025
NonFull Model
0.044 0.404 0.163 0.116 3.416 <.05
Adulterous Var 1: BPM.C.BL -0.101 0.527 0.020
Var 2: GSR.C.BL
0.412
0.013 0.392
GBJWS = Global Belief Just World Scale;
GSR.C.BL = Skin Conductance/Galvanic Skin Response from Change Baseline;
BPM.C.BL = Heart Rate/Beats per Minute Change from Baseline

Physiological arousal between experimental conditions. The next set of analyses
focused on whether the emotional arousal caused by justice-threats can be assessed using
physiological arousal indicators between the two different valance conditions, adulterous and
non-adulterous David. Does the existence of a significant difference between the amounts of
physiological arousal exhibited by individuals depend upon whether they are exposed to justicethreat provoking stimuli compared to non-threat provoking stimuli? In order to answer this
inquiry, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used. This test compares the
change from baseline physiological measures, SC and HR, between the adulterous and nonadulterous conditions during the justice-threat arousal condition (see details in Tables 8 and 9).
A statistically significant MANOVA effect was not obtained (Wilks’ Λ = 0.997, F(2, 99) =
0.147, p > 0.05). Additionally, the Box’s M value of 2.403 is associated with a p-value of .504,
which is interpreted as non-significant. Thus, the covariance matrices between the groups are
assumed equal for the purposes of the MANOVA. This suggests that even though both
conditions had different narratives before David’s car accident, neither condition had a
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perceptible difference in how emotionally aroused participants became. That is, the conditions
seem to be equally emotionally arousing.
Table 8
MANOVA: Difference of Physiological Arousal between the Adulterous and
Non-Adulterous Conditions
Predictor
df MSQ
p
Part. η2
F
Wilks’Λ
p
Full Model
0.86
0.003
0.147
0.997
>.05
Var 1: BPM.C.BL 1 0.318 0.68
Var 2: GSR.C.BL 1 0.004 0.64
GSR.C.BL = Skin Conductance/Galvanic Skin Response from Change
Baseline; BPM.C.BL = Heart Rate/Beats per Minute Change from Baseline

Table 9
Estimated Marginal Means: Physiological Measures between the Adulterous and
Non-Adulterous Conditions
95% Confidence Interval
Physiological
Std.
Condition
Mean
Measure
Error
Lower Bound Upper Bound
GSR.C.BL
Adulterous
0.044
0.018
0.009
0.079
Non-Adulterous 0.031
0.023
-0.015
0.076
BPM.C.BL

Adulterous
0.020
0.170
-0.319
0.358
Non-Adulterous -0.096
0.221
-0.535
0.343
GSR.C.BL = Skin Conductance/Galvanic Skin Response from Change Baseline;
BPM.C.BL = Heart Rate/Beats per Minute Change from Baseline

The Utility of Open-Ended Responses
Defensive strategy class frequency per experimental condition. The fourth set of
questions addressed the open-ended responses provided by participants. As stated previously,
the open-ended question inquired as to the ways in which the two events might be causally
related, however unlikely. When comparing non-adulterous and adulterous experimental
conditions, an analysis was conducted in order to investigate whether the frequency of defensive
strategy class (DSC) chosen by participants differed between conditions. Two volunteer raters
independently assessed each of the 106 participants’ hand-written causal explanations based on
the categorization criteria outlined in the procedure section of this document. No disagreement
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manifested independently with regard to inter-rater selections. In the present study, only three
DSCs were reported by participants. In the following discussion, they will be addressed as
chance, fate, and stress. A χ2 test of independence frequency comparison was performed using
the two conditions’ observed DSCs. In the adulterous condition, three DSCs appeared: chance,
fate, and stress (see page 14 Number, and page 84 for additional details with regards to ultimate
Justice or Fate judgments). In the non-adulterous condition, only two DSCs appeared: chance
and stress. There is support that the distribution of frequencies between the adulterous and nonadulterous conditions are significantly different with respect to open-ended DSC endorsement (χ2
= 7.198, df = 2, p < 0.05, Φ = 0.261; see Table 10).

DSC

Table 10
Independence χ2 Frequency Analysis: Between Condition Type and Defensive Strategy Class
Condition
Total
Non-Adulterous
Adulterous
Observed Count
28
39
67
Chance
Expected Count
24.7
42.3
67
Observed Count
0
11
11
Fate
Expected Count
4
7
11
Observed Count
11
17
28
Stress
Expected Count
10.3
17.7
28
Total
39
67
106
DSC = Defensive Strategy Class
Nevertheless, it is of note that none of the participants in the non-adulterous condition
endorsed the DSC of fate. Unfortunately the χ2 test of independence stipulates that "No more
than 20% of the expected counts are less than 5 and all individual expected counts are 1 or
greater" (Yates, Moore & McCabe, 1999, p. 734). This fact results in a dubious χ2 interpretation
because the DSC fate accounted for most of the differential effect from the expected frequency
model. Because of this, a Freeman-Halton extension of the Fisher’s exact probability test
(Freeman & Halton, 1951) was used, as it does not have a minimum cell frequency stipulation.
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This also results in a significant difference between the non-adulterous and adulterous conditions
at p < 0.05.
Defensive strategy class and physiological arousal: adulterous condition. Once
individuals were grouped into classes of strategies by their open-ended explanations, were there
any differences in the amount of emotional arousal experienced by the class groups because of
condition specific stimuli? That is, did the stimuli elicit significantly different emotional
responses between groups? In order to report on this question, two MANOVAs were used to
compare each DSC’s physiological measures of SC and HR for both experimental conditions. A
one-way MANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be one or more mean
difference between DSCs chance, fate, and stress, and physiological measure change induced in
the adulterous condition (see Tables 11 and 12 for details). A statistically significant MANOVA
effect is not present (Wilks’ Λ = 0.256, F(4, 116) = 0.252, p > 0.05, partial η2 = 0.009).
Additionally, the Box’s M value of 4.157 is associated with a p-value of 0.696, which is
interpreted as non-significant. Thus, the covariance matrices between the groups were assumed
equal for the purposes of the MANOVA. Our results agree with the previous findings, which
state that physiological arousal does not predict IJR in the adulterous condition.
Table 11
MANOVA: Predicting Defensive Strategy Class chosen from Physiological Measures
Condition
Predictor
df MSQ
p
Part. η2
F
Wilks’Λ
Adulterous Full Model
0.91
0.009
0.252
0.256
Var 1: BPM.C.BL 2 1.922 0.80
Var 2: GSR.C.BL 2 0.148 0.70
NonAdulterous

Full Model
0.80
0.013
0.225
0.988
Var 1: BPM.C.BL 1 2.057 0.67
Var 2: GSR.C.BL 1 0.155 0.56
GSR.C.BL = Skin Conductance/Galvanic Skin Response from Change Baseline;
BPM.C.BL = Heart Rate/Beats per Minute Change from Baseline

p
>.05

>.05
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Table 12
Estimated Marginal Means: Physiological Measure by Defensive Strategy Class
95% Confidence Interval
Physiological Open Causal
Condition
Mean Std. Error
Measure
Answer
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Adulterous BPM.C.BL Chance
-2.682
.483
-3.649
-1.715
Fate
-2.955
.942
-4.840
-1.070
Stress
-3.287
.796
-4.880
-1.694
GSR.C.BL
Chance
.640
.104
.431
.849
Fate
.489
.203
.082
.896
Stress
.505
.172
.161
.850
NonBPM.C.BL
Adulterous
GSR.C.BL

Chance
-3.597
.649
-4.914
-3.066
1.066
-5.230
Stress
Chance
.560
.128
.299
.706
.211
.277
Stress
GSR.C.BL = Skin Conductance/Galvanic Skin Response from Change Baseline;
BPM.C.BL = Heart Rate/Beats per Minute Change from Baseline

-2.280
-.902
.821
1.134

Defensive strategy class and physiological arousal: non-adulterous condition.
Another one-way MANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be an
observable difference between the only two DSCs selected in the non-adulterous condition chance and stress - with respect to physiological change induced by justice-threats. No
statistically significant effect was obtained between DSCs (Wilks’ Λ = 0.988, F(2, 34) = 0.208, p
> 0.05, partial η2 = 0.013). Additionally, the Box’s M value of 5.757 is associated with a pvalue of 0.155, which is interpreted as non-significant. Thus, the covariance matrices between
the groups were assumed equal for the purposes of the MANOVA (see Tables 10 and 11 for
details).
Immanent justice reasoning levels per defensive strategy class: adulterous condition.
The next set of analyses focused on whether there were any differences between DSC groups in
regards to participants’ average IJR score, in each condition. The following two ANOVAs
compare the grouped DSCs and the ways in which they differ between the groups. In the
adulterous condition, a one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to inspect whether
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participants’ IJR score was reflected in the three types of DSCs open-ended comment they chose
to favor, DSC chance, fate, and stress. Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance was violated
for this analysis (F(2,64) = 3.382, p < 0.05). Because of the violation of the present assumption,
a Welch’s F statistic was used, which does not use the assumption of homogeneity of variance.
There is a significant effect between the three DSCs, as pertaining to the level of IJR reported
(Welch’s F(2,21.75) = 19.060, p < 0.01, est. ω2 = 0.35). Post hoc comparison using the
Dunnett's T3 test (which does not assume homogeneity of variance) indicates that the mean score
for both DSCs fate (M = 4.91, SD = 0.495) and stress (M = 4.71, SD = 0.398) is significantly
higher (p < 0.01) than the score for the DSC chance (M = 2.18, SD = 0.263; see Figure 2).
Interestingly, the group means for DSCs fate and stress are nearly identical. This is reasonable
considering both DSCs fate and stress are JMB strategies, whereas chance is not (baring
penultimate defensive strategy). Taken together, these results suggest IJR scores can be reliably
obtained using both Likert type and open-ended responding because of the high consistency
between the self-report strategies.
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Figure 2. Immanent justice reasoning scores by defensive strategy classification. 95%
confidence intervals are represented in the figure by the error bars attached to each column.
Immanent justice reasoning levels per defensive strategy class: non-adulterous
condition. In the non-adulterous condition, a one-way between subjects ANOVA was
conducted to determine whether participants’ IJR score is reflected in the only two types of
DSCs open-ended comment they chose to endorse – DSCs chance and stress. Only marginal
significance was detected between the two DSCs pertaining to the level of IJR reported (F(1,37)
= 3.917, p = 0.055, R2 = 0.096). The means comparison indicates that the average IJR score for
the DSC chance (M = 1.86, SD = 0.31) is only marginally lower than for that of the DSC stress
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(M = 3.00, SD = 0.49; Figure 2). It is worth noting that the non-adulterous condition has a far
weaker effect size than the adulterous condition.
Immanent justice reasoning levels per defensive strategy class between conditions.
In order to determine whether rates of IJR were different between the adulterous stress and nonadulterous stress condition, a two-way ANOVA analysis was necessary. As the previous two
ANOVAs show that a significant main effect exists between DSC (F(2,101) = 17.156, p < 0.01),
and experimental conditions (F(1,101) = 7.301, p < 0.01). An interaction was only marginally
significant (F(1,101) = 3.397, p = 0.068), and both main effects in combination account for
32.1% of the variance, regardless. Harmonic cell means comparisons were used because of
unequal sample sizes, and are listed in Figure 2. As expected, mean cell comparisons for stress
between conditions show that individuals were somewhat less confident in their IJR responses
for the non-adulterous condition even though they were asserting the same open-ended DSCs.
Additionally, Likert IJR score is a stronger predictor of the DSC participants chose in the
adulterous condition.
Using the global belief in a just-world scale to predict chosen defensive strategy
class. The next set of analyses focused on whether there were any differences between DSC
groups in regards to participants’ average BJW score, in each condition. In order to answer these
questions, ANOVAs were used in both experimental conditions. The ANOVAs compare
GBJWS scores by the three observed DSC groupings between the two conditions. In the
adulterous condition, the one-way between subjects ANOVA shows no significant effect
between the three DSC’s methods pertaining to the level of GBJWS reported (F(2,57) = 1.312, p
> 0.05). This shows that GBJWS scores are not any better at predicting a participant’s likelihood
to commit IJR in an open-ended DSC, than on a Likert causal rating scale. Additionally, in the
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non-adulterous condition, the one-way between subjects ANOVA is not indicative of any
significant effects between the three DSC methods pertaining to the level of GBJWS reported
(F(1,32) = 0.062, p > 0.05). This also shows that GBJWS scores are poor predictors of both
Likert IJR rating scores and open-ended DSC categorization (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Global just-world belief scale by condition and defensive strategy classification. 95%
confidence intervals are represented in the figure by the error bars attached to each column.
Secondary Analyses Not Incorporated in Original Hypotheses
Using affective self-report and physiological arousal to predict immanent justice
reasoning. An investigation was made into how useful self-report Likert affect pronouncements
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were in predicting IJR scores. In each condition, a hierarchical regression analysis was
conducted. This was to see the amount of variation accounted for by self-reported affect, beyond
physiological measures.
In the adulterous condition, physiological measures alone are not significant predictors of
IJR (F(2,61) = 0.950, p > 0.05, R2 = 0.03; see Table 13). This remains consistent with previous
analyses. When the variable of self-reported affect is added into the model, the full model is
found to be a significant predictor, and accounts for an additional 17.2% of the variance in IJR
scores (F(3,60) = 5.068, p < 0.01, R2 = 0.202). There is a significant increase in the variance
accounted for by the addition of self-report affect (ΔF(1,60) = 12.933, p < 0.001, ΔR2 = 0.172;
see Table 13).
In the non-adulterous condition, physiological measures alone are again a significant
predictor of IJR scores (F(2,35) = 3.419, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.163), and account for 16.3% of the
variance. When the variable of self-reported affect is added into the model, the full model is
found to be a significant predictor, and accounts for 22.0% of the variance in IJR scores (F(3,60)
= 5.068, p < 0.01, R2 = 0.202). When the variable affect is added to the model, it does not add
any significant predictive power (ΔF(1,34) = 2.829, p > 0.05, ΔR2 = 0.064; see Table 13).
In the non-adulterous condition, another hierarchical regression was conducted in which
affect was the initial predictor. Physiological measures were added to the model, thus creating
the same analysis in the reverse order. The variable of self-reported affect is found to be a
significant predictor of IJR scores (F(1,36) = 4.720, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.116), and accounts for
11.6% of the variance (see Table 13). When the two physiological measures are added to selfreported affect, the full model is again found to significantly predict IJR scores (F(3,35) = 3.341,
p < 0.05, R2 = 0.228). Further, the addition of the physiological variables does not add any
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significant predictive power (ΔF(2,34) = 2.460, p > 0.05, ΔR2 = 0.112; see Table 13). This
suggests that in the non-adulterous condition, self-reported affect and physiological measures
account for similar proportions of the variance in the IJR score. It should be noted, however, that
these results are very speculative because of the small sample sizes of the two conditions: nad. =
64, nn-ad. = 38.
Table 13
Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Predicting Immanent Justice Reasoning Scores from
Affect and Physiological Measures
Condition
Predictor
Std.Beta
p
R
Adj R2
ΔR2
ΔF
Adulterous Step 1: GSR.C.BL -0.004
0.97 0.174 -0.002 0.030 0.950
BPM.C.BL -0.173
0.18
Step 2: GSR.C.BL
0.067
0.57 0.450 0.162 0.172 12.933
BPM.C.BL -0.115
0.33
Affect
0.426
0.001
NonStep 1: GSR.C.BL
Adulterous
BPM.C.BL
Step 2: GSR.C.BL
BPM.C.BL
Affect

0.412
-0.101
0.350
-0.054
0.263

0.01
0.53
0.03
0.73
0.10

p
>.05
<.001

0.404

0.116

0.163

3.419

<.05

0.477

0.160

0.064

2.829

<.05

NonStep 1: Affect
0.340
0.04 0.340 0.091 0.116 4.720
Adulterous Step 2: Affect
0.263
0.10 0.477 0.160 0.112 2.460
GSR.C.BL 0.350
0.03
BPM.C.BL -0.054
0.73
Affect = Summed Scores of Affective Items 1, 3, and Reverse 6; GSR.C.BL = Skin
Conductance/Galvanic Skin Response from Change Baseline; BPM.C.BL =
Heart Rate/Beats per Minute Change from Baseline

<.05
<.05

Affective self-report between conditions comparison. The next analysis focused on
whether the deservedness of David’s accident caused average levels of self-reported affect to
change between the two conditions, adulterous and non-adulterous David. In order to answer
this question an independent samples Welch’s t-test was used. This test compares the affective
self-report measure between the adulterous and non-adulterous conditions during the
experimental phase. The adulterous condition affect score (M = 16.0, SD = 3.401, n = 69) shows
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significantly higher levels of affect in comparison to the non-adulterous condition (M = 13.9, SD
= 2.87, n = 40; Welch’s t(93.96) = 3.553, p < 0.001; Figure 4). A Welch’s t-test analysis was
used because of the unbalanced design, conversely Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance is
not significant (F(1,107) = 1.241, p > 0.05). As a result, a Student’s t-test was also conducted
comparing the affective self-report measure between conditions. This also shows that the
adulterous condition has significantly higher affect scores than the non-adulterous condition
(t(107) = 3.397, p < 0.001). This result suggests that participants reported the adulterous
condition narrative as more affect provoking than the non-adulterous condition. Given that
previous results did not detect a significant difference with respect to physiological arousal
between conditions (see page 50), the above might indicate that implicit and explicit indicators
of emotional arousal are different constructs.
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Figure 4. Self-Report Affect Scores compared between Experimental Conditions. 95%
confidence intervals are represented in the figure by the error bars attached to each column.

Baseline and immanent justice reasoning phase question response latency. Question
response latency, the amount of time it took participants to respond to Likert questions, was
investigated as a predictor variable for IJR. In both phases (baseline condition and experimental
condition), question types were grouped into two categories - judgment and affect. These
variables were used to establish a measure of question response latency in order to investigate if
the time it took participants to answer certain types of questions exhibited predictive power
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pertaining to their IJR judgments, and if either experimental condition played a role in question
response latency.
In the baseline condition, three judgment questions (i.e. Question 3, 4, and 7) were used
to establish baseline question latency for judgment oriented questions. These judgment type
questions prompted participants to make causal connections between narrative details, such as
whether coffee causes individuals to get sick. Figure 5 describes the exact calculation.
𝑄3 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑄4 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑄7 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐽𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
=(
+
+
)⁄3
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
# 𝑄3 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 # 𝑄4 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 # 𝑄7 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
Figure 5. Baseline judgment condition seconds per word latency equation.
In the baseline condition, three affect questions (i.e. Question 2, 6, and 8) were used to establish
baseline question response latency for affect oriented questions. These affect type questions
prompted participants to report the affective quality of the narrative details, such as how happy
the narrative information made participants feel. Figure 6 outlines the exact calculation.
𝑄2 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑄6 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑄8 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
=(
+
+
)⁄3
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
# 𝑄2 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 # 𝑄6 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 # 𝑄8 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
Figure 6. Baseline affect condition seconds per word latency equation.
In the experimental condition, four judgment questions (i.e. Question 2, 8, and 9, 13) were used
to establish IJR question response latency for judgment oriented questions. These judgment type
questions prompted participants to make causal connections between narrative details, such as
whether David’s dealing with Susanne was the cause of his car accident. Figure 7 details the
exact calculation.
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𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐽𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
=(

𝑄2 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑄8 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑄9 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑄13 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
+
+
+
)⁄4
# 𝑄2 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 # 𝑄8 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 # 𝑄9 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 # 𝑄13 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠

Figure 7. Experimental judgment condition seconds per word latency equation.
In the experimental condition, three affect questions (i.e. Question 1, 3, and 6) were used to
establish IJR question response latency for affect oriented questions. These affect type questions
prompted participants to report the affective quality of the narrative details, such as how happy
the narrative information made the participants feel. Figure 8 illustrates the exact calculation.
𝑄1 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑄3 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑄6 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
=(
+
+
)⁄3
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
# 𝑄1 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 # 𝑄3 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 # 𝑄6 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
Figure 8. Experimental affect condition seconds per word latency equation.
Judgment question response latency between conditions. An analysis was conducted
in order to investigate whether there was a difference between how long it took participants to
answer judgment type questions between the two conditions: adulterous and non-adulterous. An
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted which used participants’ baseline average
judgment type question response latencies as a covariate, and compared the difference between
experimental condition average judgment type question response latencies. Levene’s test for
homogeneity of variance is not significant, therefore no violation of the assumption of
homogeneity of variance is detected (F(1,107) = 2.945, p > 0.05). It is notable, however, that the
adulterous and non-adulterous condition sample sizes were unbalanced: nad. = 69, nn-ad. = 40.
Nevertheless, results suggest that there is not a significant difference between experimental
conditions with regard to judgment question latency (F(1,106) = 0.258, p > 0.05, η2 = 0.02).
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Using judgment question response latency to predict immanent justice reasoning.
The next set of analyses focused on whether participants’ judgment question response latency
has predictive power with regard to their IJR in both conditions, after controlling for
participants’ baseline judgment question response latency. Therefore, this calls into question
whether or not the duration participants took to answer the experimental condition’s causal
judgment questions correlated with the level of Likert IJR they reported, in addition to whether
or not the two experimental conditions differed.
In order to answer these questions, a hierarchical linear regression was used for each
condition: IJR adulterous and IJR non-adulterous. Each condition’s hierarchical linear
regression consisted of a regression analysis that assessed the predictive power on participants’
reports of IJR using participants’ baseline judgment question response latency as the first level
covariate and their experimental judgment question latency as the second level main predictor
variable. Each regression analysis used the participants’ baseline judgment question response
latencies as a control variable, in order to account for random variation in participants’ question
answering speed. In the adulterous condition, results of the first level of hierarchical regression
indicate that the baseline judgment question latencies are not a significant predictor of IJR
(F(1,67) = 0.056, p > 0.05, R2 = 0.001). Moreover, when combined with the experimental
judgment question latency, the full model is not a significant predictor of IJR (F(2,66) = 0.756,
p > 0.05, R2 = 0.022). When controlling for baseline latency, there is not a significant increase in
variance accounted for by the addition of the IJR question response latency variable (ΔF(1,66) =
1.455, p > 0.05, ΔR2 = 0.022; see Table 14). This shows that in the adulterous condition,
experimental judgment question latency does not have an observable amount of predictive power
with regard to IJR scores.
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In the non-adulterous condition, the results of our first level of hierarchical regression
indicate that the baseline judgment question response latencies are only a marginally significant
predictor of IJR (F(1,38) = 3.294, p = 0.077, R2 = 0.080). When combined with the
experimental judgment question latency, both variables are also only marginally significant
predictors of IJR (F(2,37) = 2.566, p = 0.090, R2 = 0.122). When controlling for baseline
latency, there is not a significant increase in variance accounted for by the addition of the IJR
question response latency variable (ΔF(1,37) = 1.772, p > 0.05, ΔR2 = 0.042; see Table 14).
This shows that in the non-adulterous condition, experimental judgment question latency does
not have an observable amount of predictive power with regard to IJR scores.
Table 14
Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Predicting Immanent Justice Reasoning Scores from
Causal Question Response Latency after controlling for Baseline
Condition
Std.Beta
p
R
Adj R2
ΔR2
ΔF
p
Predictor
Adulterous
Step 1:
-0.029
0.81 0.029 -0.014 0.001 0.056 >.05
BL.CQ.Lat
Step 2:
-0.149
0.35 0.150 -0.007 0.022 1.455 >.05
BL.CQ.Lat
0.190
0.23
IJR.CQ.Lat
NonAdulterous

Step 1:
BL.CQ.Lat
Step 2:
BL.CQ.Lat

0.282

0.08

0.282

0.056

0.080

3.294

>.05

0.464

0.03

0.349

0.074

0.042

1.772

>.05

-0.274
0.19
IJR.CQ.Lat
BL.CQ.Lat = Baseline Causal Question Response Latency;
IJR.CQ.Lat = Immanent Justice Reasoning Causal Question Response Latency

Affect question response latency between conditions comparison. An analysis was
conducted in order to investigate whether there was a difference between how long it took
participants to answer affect type questions between the two conditions: adulterous and non-
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adulterous. An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted which used participants’
baseline averages of affect type question latencies as a covariate, and compared the difference
between experimental condition average of affect type question response latencies. Levene’s test
for homogeneity of variance was not significant, therefore no violation of the assumption of
homogeneity of variance was detected (F(1,107) = 0.158, p > 0.05), however condition sample
sizes were unbalanced: nad. = 69, nn-ad. = 40. Results show that there is a significant difference
between IJR adulterous (est. marginal M = 591.8, SE = 18.43) and non-adulterous (est. marginal
M = 539.4, SE = 14.036) conditions with regards to affect question latency (F(1,106) = 5.081, p
< 0.05, η2 = 0.046), yet the between conditions effect size is weak.
Using affect question response latency to predict immanent justice reasoning. The
next set of analyses focused on whether participants’ affect question response latency has
predictive power with regard to their IJR in both experimental conditions, after controlling for
participants’ baseline affect question response latency. These call into question whether the
duration participants took to answer the experimental condition affect questions correlated with
level of IJR they report, and whether the two experimental conditions differ.
In order to answer these questions, a hierarchical linear regression was used for each
conditions: IJR adulterous, IJR non-adulterous. Each condition’s hierarchical linear regression
consisted of a regression analysis which assessed the predictive power on participants’ report of
IJR using participants’ baseline affect question response latency as the first level covariate and
their experimental affect question response latency as the second level main predictor variable.
Each regression analysis used participants’ baseline affect question response latencies as the
control variable, in order to account for random variation in participants’ question answering
speed. In the adulterous condition, results of the first level hierarchical regression indicate that
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the baseline affect question latencies were not a significant predictor of IJR (F(1,67) = 0.051, p
> 0.05, R2 = 0.001), and when combined with the experimental affect question response latency,
both variables are not significant predictors of IJR (F(2,66) = 0.028, p > 0.05, R2 = 0.001).
When controlling for baseline latency, there is not a significant increase in variance accounted
for by the addition of the affect question response latency variable (ΔF(1,66) = 0.006, p > 0.05,
ΔR2 = 0.000; see Table 15). This shows that in the adulterous condition, experimental affect
question latency does not have an observable amount of predictive power with regard to IJR
scores.
In the non-adulterous condition, results of the first level hierarchical regression indicate
that the baseline judgment question latencies are not a significant predictor of IJR (F(1,38) =
1.542, p > 0.05, R2 = 0.04), and when controlling for baseline latency, experimental affect
question latency is also not a significant predictor of IJR (F(2,37) = 2.270, p > 0.05, R2 = 0.11).
When controlling for baseline latency, there is not a significant increase in variance accounted
for by the addition of the affect question response latency variable (ΔF(1,37) = 2.921, p > 0.05,
ΔR2 = 0.070; see Table 15). This shows that in the non-adulterous condition, experimental affect
question latency does not have an observable amount of predictive power with regard to IJR
scores.
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Table 15
Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Predicting Immanent Justice Reasoning Scores from
Affective Question Response Latency after controlling for Baseline
Condition
Std.Beta
p
R
Adj R2
ΔR2
ΔF
p
Predictor
Adulterous
Step 1:
0.028
0.82 0.028 -0.014 0.001 0.051 >.05
BL.AQ.Lat
Step 2:
0.038
0.84 0.029 -0.029 0.000 0.006 >.05
BL.AQ.Lat
-0.014
0.94
IJR.AQ.Lat
NonAdulterous

Step 1:
BL.AQ.Lat
Step 2:
BL.AQ.Lat

0.197

0.22

0.197

0.014

0.039

1.542

>.05

0.485

0.04

0.331

0.061

0.070

2.921

>.05

-0.391
0.10
IJR.AQ.Lat
BL.AQ.Lat = Baseline Affect Question Response Latency; IJR.AQ.Lat = Affect Question
Response Latency During Experimental Condition

Tables 16 and 17 illustrate the correlation matrix between each of the variables under
both conditions. Question latency was calculated to be heavily correlated with all latency
variables, however none were correlated with IJR scores.
Table 16
Pearson Correlation Coefficients Table: Adulterous Condition Latency Specific
Correlations with Immanent Justice Reasoning Scores
Baseline
Baseline
Causal
Adulterous
IJR
Causal
Affect
Item
Condition
Scores
Latency
Latency
Latency
Baseline Causal Latency
-0.029
Baseline Affect Latency
0.028
0.516**
Causal Item Latency
0.095
0.633**
0.599**
**
Affect Item Latency
0.014
0.461
0.741**
0.506**
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Pearson Correlation Coefficients Table: Non-Adulterous Condition Latency Specific
Correlations with Immanent Justice Reasoning Scores
Baseline
Baseline
Causal
Non-Adulterous
IJR
Causal
Affect
Item
Condition
Scores
Latency
Latency
Latency
Baseline Causal Latency
0.282
Baseline Affect Latency
0.197
0.810**
Causal Item Latency
0.034
0.664**
0.622**
**
Affect Item Latency
-0.034
0.570
0.735**
0.565**
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Discussion

In order to maximize clarity and ease of understanding throughout the following
discussion section, the below text is an outline of some of the major themes and terms used in the
present study. This study was a replication of a study done by Callan, Ellard, and Nicol (2006)
with the addition of continuous measures of physiological arousal. It consisted of three phases: a
survey phase, a baseline phase, and an experimental phase. In the survey phase, a number of
individual difference measures were administered to participants, the most important being the
Lupkis’s (1991) Global Belief in a Just World Scale (GBJWS) assessment. In the baseline
phase, participants were introduced to a neutral narrative about caffeine. This baseline phase
was used to acclimate participants to the process of answering questions about a narrative. In the
experimental phase, participants were introduced to one of two conditions: a narrative where the
main character (David) has a rendezvous with a female coworker in either a virtuous or
adulterous manner. These narratives were designed to induce in the participants a particular
form of cognitive attribution by which they modify their attitudes or beliefs about events in order
to make themselves feel as if they live in a just world. This is called a justice-motivated
behavior (JMB). Specifically, participants were being induced to commit a JMB through which
they drew a causal relationship between two events which were unlikely to be related – David’s
dealings with his colleague Susanne (either virtuous or not) and his rendezvous with her. The
possible causal influence on David being brutally struck in a motor vehicle accident was in
regards to the nature of David’s interactions with Susanne. When participants reported they
believed there to be a causal relationship, it was classified as a JMB known as immanent justice
reasoning (IJR): the idea that a “fault will automatically bring about its own punishment”
(Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 256).
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A number of dependent measure variables were assessed, the most important of which
were the presence, magnitude, and the method of participants’ IJR behavior. These were
measured using self-report questions using a Likert scale and open-ended responses. The openended answers were categorized by defensive strategy class (DSC) pertaining to what method or
logic the participant used to causally relate the two events. In the present study, only three DSCs
were reported by participants. In the following discussion, they will be addressed as chance,
fate, and stress. The following is predominately a discussion regarding how participants’
individual difference measures, physiological responding, and dependent measure responses
relate to their IJR scores. Contained in Appendix A is a key of all acronyms used throughout this
document for the reader’s convenience.
Belief in a Just-World Measures
Belief in a just-world measures have received the bulk of the attention in just-world
hypothesis research, and no measure has generated more research than Lupkis’s (1991) GBJWS
assessment. The GBJWS has been used in the prediction of a diverse array of JMB, and the
scale’s predictive power has been unreliable or underwhelming at best (Hafer & Begue, 2005).
In the present study, GBJWS had little power in predicting either of the experimentally observed
JMBs – Likert reported IJR and DSC open-ended responses. This is consistent with Callan,
Ellard, and Nicol’s (2006) original findings. Additionally, the GBJWS did not add any
predictive value when used in conjunction with variables that have predictive power, such as
stimulus-induced physiological arousal. Perhaps the reason that interest in the belief in a just
world (BJW) measures have endured is because they correlate with other variables and
assessments that have shown predictive power with regard to JMBs (Rubin & Peplau, 1975; see
correlation Tables 1, 2 and 3 for examples in this experiment).
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It should be noted, however, that the present study gathered nearly all individual
difference measures, including BJW, hours or days before the actual experiment took place.
This method was chosen for two reasons. First, for practical reasons, the experiment’s in-lab
time requirements were kept under an hour for participants. Secondly, by separating the survey
questions from the in-house experiment, it was hoped that such temporal distance would limit the
priming and clueing effects of assessments upon participants’ in-lab behavior. It is possible that
some of the significant results found historically in BJW assessments were because of the
temporal proximity to other portions of the experiment. We sought to limit such effects, and
recognize that it would be useful to investigate this in future research.
Replications
Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s (2006) findings. This thesis experiment had several
components that acted as full or partial replications of previous experiments. The first
replication was of Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s (2006) first scenario study during which they
investigated whether sufficient motivation led individuals to be more likely to assert a causal
relationship between two events that are unlikely to have been causally related. The motivation,
in this case, was whether the main character (David) was an adulterous or virtuous individual.
Our results suggest that when David was an adulterous individual, participants were significantly
more likely to believe that the events of his affair were causally related to his subsequent car
accident (i.e. IJR). This remains consistent with Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s original finding. It
was necessary for this experiment to replicate the previous results not only in order to validate its
design and implementation, but also because it was important to verify that the adulterous
condition – in which David was more “deserving” of the outcome – had significantly higher
levels of IJR. The significant difference in the levels of IJR between conditions set the
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groundwork work for investigating the possibility that cognitive dissonance might be
differentially influencing participants’ judgments under conditions with and without a
“deserved” outcome.
Tomaka and Blascovich’s (1994) findings. This thesis also incorporated a replication
of Tomaka and Blascovich’s (1994) original study. Tomaka and Blascovich’s study was
designed to determine whether a BJW measure was able to predict how an individual reacts
emotionally to a stressful situation (i.e. serial subtraction task). Their experiment was designed
to support the hypothesis that individuals who had a high BJW were better adapted to manage
environmental stressors. Moreover, it is through this belief that individuals are able to
ameliorate the perceived injustices in the world, and gain more confidence in his/her own
endeavors. This thesis was not designed to determine whether individuals with higher levels of
BJW are better suited to handle stressful situations, but sought to replicate Tomaka and
Blascovich’s physiological results. In reproducing their previous findings – GBJWS scores can
predict the cardiovascular activity of participants while preforming a serial subtraction task – the
working order of our physiological measurement apparatus was established.
Our results are consistent with Tomaka and Blascovich’s (1994) findings in which
GBJWS scores were a significant predictor of stress induced emotional arousal as shown by
physiological measures. Even though this thesis study did not find GBJWS scores to be
predictive of IJR, it demonstrated the scores as a weak predictor of participants’ cardiovascular
functioning during an arithmetic task. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the BJW
construct should be thought of as generalizable to other stressful activities. In Tomaka and
Blascovich’s study, the arithmetic stress task was thought to be a generalizable, challenging
activity. While this is possibly the case, previous theorists had discussed that individuals with a
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higher BJW might be better adapted to perform certain specific tasks (Rubin & Peplau, 1975).
BJW assessments are often correlated with additional variables that are more predictive of task
performance such as education quality/level, economic status, locus of control, social
desirability, and personality facets (Hafer & Bugue, 2005). This makes it difficult to interpret
the relationship between the level of stress induced by the arithmetic task, task performance, and
individuals' BJW. Regardless, the physiological data gathered suggests that our apparatus is
functioning properly because of the observation of a similar relationship between the GBJWS
scores and cardiovascular output.
Lastly, an interesting note is that the serial subtraction task’s baseline in this thesis had a
duration of only four minutes, which was nine minutes shorter than Tomaka and Blascovich’s
(1994) original baseline. This suggests that obtaining notable physiological results may not
require as long a duration as previously believed.
Emotional Arousal and Just-World Research
Unique to this experiment was the inclusion of the emotional arousal assessment. The
investigation of physiological indicators of emotional arousal, as well as emotional arousal’s
possible influence over JMBs has not typically been included in the just-world literature.
Implicit in this investigation was the inference that if elevated levels of emotional arousal were
assessed in conjunction with JMBs, this would be support that individuals’ emotional arousal
played some role in their judgments. The present experiment gave some indication that this was
the case.
Although many investigators have suggested a relationship between emotionality and
decision/judgments (Lerner, 1980; Blader & Tyler, 2002), it was rare for just-world hypothesis
researchers to externally manipulate participants’ emotional arousal by means other than
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reducing the justice-threat provoking quality of one of the conditions. A notable exception to
this was Thorton’s (1984) work where it was shown that priming participants to be sensitive to
their emotions prior to the exposure of justice-threat stimuli increased the likelihood that
participants blamed the victim. While this experiment did not provide confirmation that
emotional arousal was causing JMBs, it revealed an interesting situation in which emotional
arousal and IJR were correlated.
Using the global belief in a just-world scale to predict physiological arousal. An
investigation was conducted in order to determine whether the GBJWS assessment was a reliable
predictor of an individual’s emotional arousal induced by justice-threat provoking stimuli as a
replication of Tomaka and Blascovich’s (1994) study. In Theory, BJW assessments are
indicative of an individual’s global sensitivity to justice-threats. That is to say, according to
Learner (1980), individuals who developed such strong beliefs in a just world did so in order to
ameliorate the stress induced by perceived injustices. In this thesis, participants were exposed to
the injustice that David was hit by a car despite testimony that he was a virtuous person. This is
not to say that participants did not perceive any injustice in the outcome when David was
adulterous. A more precise explanation is that participants are less likely to perceive injustice
when David was behaving badly as compared to when he was virtuous, despite identical
outcomes (Callan, Ellard & Nicol, 2006). As stated previously, under both the adulterous and
non-adulterous conditions, the physiological arousal induced by the justice-threat provoking
stimuli was not predicted by the GBJWS assessment. Yet these findings do not necessarily
contradict Lerner’s (1980) original theory. The challenge raised concerns whether or not the
GBJWS assessment – or any BJW assessment – has the ability to determine how sensitive
individuals are to justice-threats, particularly if those justice-threats are very situation dependent.
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Intuitively, one would expect that response to adultery is not uniform among individuals, and
that there might be even more variability in reaction to grisly car accidents. A reasonable
explanation as to why BJW assessments have been inconsistent predictors of JMBs (Hafer &
Bugue, 2005) is because BJW assessments might lack power in predicting behaviors when
situational factors – or idiosyncratic sensitivities – are more influential than a general BJW.
Using individual difference measures and physiological arousal to predict
immanent justice reasoning. One of the important questions this thesis addressed was whether
the emotional arousal caused by justice-threats could be assessed using physiological arousal
measures and whether physiological measures alone would be significant predictors of IJR. The
answer is yes, but only during the non-adulterous condition when David was least “deserving” of
the outcome.
A number of analyses were conducted to investigate which variables and variable
combinations had the highest predictive power with regard to IJR. Results showed that the
variables that predicted IJR in the adulterous condition were different from those in the nonadulterous condition. In the adulterous condition, the only useful predictive variables for IJR
were self-reported deservedness and self-reported affect. Self-reported deservedness represented
participants’ belief that David “deserved” the car accident, and self-reported affect represented
participants’ impressions of the affective nature of the stimulus. Unsurprisingly, these two
variables were moderately correlated with each other (r = 0.48, p < 0.01). This supports Callan,
Ellard, and Nicol’s (2006) findings that suggest deservedness is a strong mediator of IJR. None
of the other self-report individual difference measures (e.g. socioeconomic status, GBJWS,
conservatism, etc.) produced any significant results save one – self-reported affect. This is
interesting because physiological arousal was not a reliable predictor of IJR despite it often being
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considered as related to a person’s affect. Although one would expect that self-reports of
emotional arousal would at least be correlated with physiological arousal, they were not.
In the non-adulterous condition, only self-reported affect and physiological arousal had
predictive power with regard to IJR scores. This result is remarkable for a few reasons. First,
physiological arousal was only a predictor variable when participants were presented with the
justice-threat stimuli in the non-adulterous condition. This suggests that only in the condition
where participants were exposed to an “undeserved” outcome did their physiological arousal
predict whether participants would blame David for his circumstances. Second, the variables of
self-reported affect and physiological arousal were not correlated in either of the two conditions,
yet in the non-adulterous conditions, both significantly predicted IJR scores.
The most interesting finding in the two conditions is not which variables predicted IJR
scores, but how these variables relate to the IJR scores in different ways. To summarize, selfreported affect alone was moderately predictive of IJR scores in both conditions, yet measures of
physiological arousal were only predictive under the non-adulterous condition. Additionally,
physiological arousal was not significantly correlated with self-reported affect in either
condition. This may lead to a number of different interpretations.
The first conclusion that can be drawn is that self-reported affect and physiological
arousal are wholly different constructs. Thus, they should not be used interchangeably in an
experimental sense, as they seem to address different cognitive processes. It seems that
participants were poorly influenced by how emotional they felt while reading David’s ordeal, as
suggested by the fact that self-reported affect and physiological arousal were not correlated with
each other. The two possible conclusions that can be drawn from this are that (1) participants
were not attending to their bodily sensations while they were reading the stimulus information,
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or (2) the way they believed they should answer the affective questions rendered their actual
feelings irrelevant. Regardless, both variables predicted IJR moderately in the non-adulterous
condition, and account for similar proportions of the variation.
There are a number of different hypotheses as to why physiological arousal only matters
during the “undeserved” outcome condition. For example, how does empathy play into victim
blame? If participants were experiencing an empathetic reaction to David’s plight, then it is
possible that they were employing some form of motivated reasoning to explain the perceived
injustice. This is in contrast to the adulterous condition where participants potentially drew an
immediate judgment (e.g., he was an adulterer and “deserved” to be hit) resulting in less
motivation to explain David’s outcome. This reduced motivation might explain why
physiological arousal lost its ability to predict IJR. Perhaps participants were not concerned
enough to get upset in an attempt to rationalize away the injustice (e.g. “bad things happen to bad
people”). It has been suspected that in the realm of victim blame, empathy might be the conduit
by which our feelings are brought to the surface (Blader & Tyler, 2002). The more brutal the
punishment an individual witnesses released upon a helpless bystander, the more empathy they
feel. When an individual has increased feelings of empathy in a painful or negative situation it
leads to stress. Therefore, the more empathy they feel, the more powerful the drive to ameliorate
their stress. One way to do so is by blaming the victim. This suggests that it does not matter
how much emotional arousal or stress an individual felt when viewing the misfortune of another.
If the misfortune was perceived to be deserved, then there is no empathy for the victim. Thus,
any present emotional arousal participants may or may not have felt will not translate into a
JMB. This makes emotional arousal irrelevant when David is characterized as an adulterous
individual, because other judgment processes take precedence. Yet measures of the affective
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quality of the stimuli are predictive of IJR. This predictability may be because the measures
reflect less the emotions of the participant, but more the emotions the participant wants to have,
thinks they should have, and/or believes him/herself to have.
Nevertheless, these remain speculations, as a result of the study’s small sample size. A
larger sample size and a third predictor variable of emotionality might be incorporated into future
research in order to be more confident in these findings. As in Thornton’s (1984) study, this
thesis assessed the affective nature of the stimuli using Likert questions in order to prime
participants’ emotional awareness. The self-report affect items were dispersed randomly among
the IJR items. Because of this, both assessments may have unintentionally suffered a loss of
independence and therefore have been subject to response bias. Such bias would render the
affective nature of the stimuli difficult to interpret. Yet, it should be noted that, the physiological
arousal that participants exhibited could not have been influenced by the affective assessment
because it came after all key physiological measures were obtained. Therefore, the possibility
remains that participants’ physiological arousal may have influenced their susceptibility to the
priming effects of the affective questions. The hypothesis that physiological arousal is a
moderator of the priming effect is, unfortunately, untestable in this thesis because of the study’s
small sample size.
Physiological arousal between Experimental conditions. One of the distinctive
qualities in this experiment was that both conditions (adulterous and non-adulterous) were
designed to provoke emotional arousal. This differs from Learner’s (1980) unpublished SC
study where the emotionality of the justice-threat stimuli was removed between conditions by
informing the participants that what they were witnessing had been staged. It was the intention
of the present experiment to maintain an equal level of emotionality in both conditions. This was
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necessary in order to isolate justice-threat provoking stimuli as the effective condition
manipulation. There were no significant differences between the two experimental conditions
with respect to physiological arousal, yet a significant difference was detected between both
conditions with respect to the self-reported affect. This variable represented the explicit
emotionality of the stimulus, and this emotionality was found to be higher in the adulterous
condition. As mentioned previously, the fact that these two variables of emotionality (i.e.
physiological arousal and self-reported affect) were in disagreement is peculiar, and further
substantiates the idea that both variables reflect different psychological constructs. The lack of
discernable difference of the levels of physiological arousal between conditions suggests that the
change in “deservedness” of the outcome was being manipulated between conditions, not the
general emotionality of stimuli.
This study was designed to answer a very specific question: what part do emotions play
with regard to IJR? Our results suggest that emotions play an important predictive part with
respect to IJR. Subsequently, the question became: which emotions – the emotions felt or the
ones expressed? Whether conscious of their feelings or not, a large amount of literature suggests
that the motivating factor in an individual’s reasoning is the emotional quality of what one
perceives (Forgas, 1995). The present study found support for the idea that individuals’
emotional arousal has the potential to illicit IJR when a perceived injustice is undeserved.
Relatedly, self-reported affect is predictive of IJR. Additionally, this study’s data support that
when a perceived injustice is more deserved, the self-reported affective quality of the injustice is
a reliable predictor of IJR, but not of emotional arousal. That is, the way participants thought
they felt about David’s adulterous behavior and subsequent accident bears more weight in
making a causal connection than any of the assessed physiological measures. This is assuming
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the participants actually thought they were upset, and did not merely respond in a biased way for
social desirability reasons – an assumption that perhaps should not be made. Either way, it
seems that the feelings participants reported about the stimuli were overarching and important in
both conditions when predicting IJR.
Another way of explaining these findings is to illustrate with an example. It might be the
case that feeling aghast at David’s adulterous behavior makes individuals feel good about
themselves. In a sense, this may potentially satisfy some perspective of social desirability in the
participant. Once this social perspective is established, all other perspectives might stem from it.
As already reported in this study, IJR is predicted solely by self-reported affect in the adulterous
condition, whereas it is predicted by both self-reported affect and physiological data in the nonadulterous condition. This divergence in the predictive power of the two emotional measures
might be because participants expressed themselves in a socially desirable manner – rather than
expressing how they truly felt – regarding David’s adulterous behavior. Whether participants
were conscious of such personal deception is unknown, however, this behavior has many
features akin to a cognitive dissonance drive state. That is, behaviors driven by the state of
experiencing inconsistent thoughts, beliefs, or attitudes, especially as related to behavioral
decisions and attitude change (Festinger, 1957).
The Utility of Open-Ended Responses
One of the interesting manipulations in Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s (2006) experiment
was to utilize an open-ended response in addition to Likert type self-report measures when
assessing JMBs. The open-ended responses were coded into specific DSCs. This coding was
based on how participants chose to explain David’s car accident, and whether it had anything do
to with his prior dealings with Susanne: either as a travel agent helping David plan a trip for his
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family, or as a women with whom David was engaging in an unrepentant affair (depending on
condition). A number of analyses were carried out comparing these DSCs to Likert self-report
measures, the GBJWS assessment, and physiological measures of arousal induced by justicethreats in the stimuli.
Contrary to Callan, Ellard, and Nicol’s prolonged suffering experiment, only three
different types of DSC explanations were observed in this study’s two conditions. In this
discussion, the three categories will be addressed as chance, fate, and stress. The chance
category includes the ideas of chance, chaos, a lack of cause/effect, and a general lack of
explanation for events. Chance is not a JMB; a sample participant response might be, “there is
no relationship – that happened completely by chance.” The fate category includes the ideas of
fate, karma, destiny/predestined, justice, etc. under the umbrella of an overarching/long-term
ultimate justice being served, usually in the idea of an afterlife. Fate is a JMB; a sample
participant response might be, “that was always going to happen, it was fate.” Lastly, the stress
category includes the ideas of stress, guilt, distraction, etc. under the overarching idea of natural
causal rationalization (NCR). Stress is a JMB; a sample participant response might be, “I think
the best explanation for what happened is that he must have been stressed out.”
Defensive strategy class frequencies per condition. It is worth noting that the
participants of the non-adulterous condition never chose fate as the cause of David’s accident,
but participants in the adulterous condition did. If, in the adulterous condition, we exclude the
participants who chose fate as the explanation for David’s misfortune, an interesting effect is
observed. It is noticed that chance and stress are represented by a ratio of five to two,
respectively. This is interesting because it is nearly identical to the ratio found in the nonadulterous condition, where fate was not chosen by a single participant.
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The ratio being nearly identical in both the adulterous and non-adulterous groups is
interesting because one would expect to see more participants trying to explain David’s accident
through rational means (e.g. vacation planning stress) in the non-adulterous condition, as no clear
justified cause (i.e. adulterousness) was provided. It is possible that the virtuous nature of the
non-adulterous David makes participants unlikely to choose fate in this condition. Individuals
who attributed an adulterous, “deserving” David’s accident to fate would see a virtuous,
“undeserving” David’s misfortune and choose an alternative JMB strategy, such as stress. Were
this the case, the frequency distributions of the two groups (adulterous and non-adulterous)
would differ – more participants would have selected stress as an explanation for the accident.
Surprisingly, however, the ratios of the conditions were nearly identical.
Priming is one possible explanation for this outcome. Prior to the open-ended section of
the assessment, one of the questions presented to the participants in both conditions, as in Callan,
Ellard, and Nicol’s (2006) original study, was “How possible is it that the stress David had felt
previously with his travel agent affected his ability to walk across streets safely?” Therefore, it
is possible that an even proportion of participants chose stress as an explanation under both
conditions because the preceding stress question primed the idea of stress in their minds.
Using the global belief in a just-world scale to predict defensive strategy class
selection. As reported earlier, our results suggest that the predictive power of Lupkus’ (1996)
GBJWS was poor at best with regard to Likert IJR measure. Therefore, the next question one
might ask is: does the predictive power of the GBJWS assessment increase when JMBs are
classified into DSCs? The answer is no. When participants’ open-ended responses were
categorized into DSCs, the GBJWS failed to have any predictive power over which causal
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explanation they chose. None of the other individual difference measures possessed any
predictive power, save IJR as discussed below.
The association between defensive strategy class selection and immanent justice
reasoning reports. In order to investigate whether the method of obtaining open-ended DSC
response classifications has any predictive power, it is important to first ask if there was any
correlation between the DSC participants chose and the participants’ Likert IJR responses. In the
adulterous condition, DSCs and IJR were well correlated (adjusted R = 0.61, p < 0.01). That is,
when participants were grouped by their chosen DSC, the individuals who selected fate and
stress had significantly higher mean Likert IJR responses than those who chose the non-JMB
chance.
In the non-adulterous condition, no relationship was observed. That is, when grouped by
DSCs the chance and stress groups were shown to have a marginally significant difference in
regards to their mean Likert IJR levels. This is strange, given that in the adulterous condition the
two groups (stress and chance) showed significantly different mean IJR scores. Additionally,
the IJR scores of participants who chose stress were compared between adulterous and nonadulterous conditions. Participants in the non-adulterous condition had significantly lower IJR
scores than the participants in the adulterous condition. In other words, individuals who chose
stress as a response in the non-adulterous condition were less certain (as exhibited by lower IJR
scores) than those in the adulterous condition that a causal relationship existed. This was
suggested in a significant interaction effect between conditions and DSC groupings. This
suggests that the classification methodology was eliciting a different, or more complex, cognitive
behavior when measured by written responses than when making a choice on a Likert scale.
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Additionally, it suggests that participants were not simply repeating their immediate impressions
in extended, written form.
Measures of physiological arousal and its predictive power concerning defensive
strategy class selection. Much attention has been paid to the finding that physiological arousal
measures were good predictors of the Likert IJR responses under conditions where the outcome
was less “deserved” (i.e. non-adulterous condition). It therefore became necessary to ask
whether this result would still hold true for other JMB methods such as the cognitively complex
open-ended DSC classification method, as it did for Likert-type JMB. Interestingly, our results
show that participants’ open-ended DSC explanations were not predicted by the physiological
arousal they experienced in either condition: adulterous or non-adulterous. Both conditions
failed to show significant differences with respect to physiological arousal when grouped by
DSC. This is rather surprising, considering that the preceding section’s analysis suggests openended DSCs and Likert IJR were reasonably well correlated (adjusted R = 0.61, p < 0.01) under
the adulterous condition.
Nevertheless, there are a few possible ways to explain this discrepancy between the JMB
assessment methods of Likert IJR and classification into DSCs. First, this discrepancy could be
explained by the fact that IJR is only well correlated with DSCs in the adulterous condition – the
same condition that is not significantly predicted by physiological measures. In addition, it is
possible that the Likert IJR methodology indicated both the existence and the severity (i.e. 1
through 7) of the IJR question. This, in turn, added information that increased the predictive
power of the physiological measures. Lastly, the Likert IJR method might have assessed a more
implicit emotional response from participants, especially considering the ease at which responses
can be given quickly. On the other hand, the open-ended response assessed a more explicit,
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rational judgment. This would mean that the Likert responses were more effected by implicit
emotional sentiments, while cognitively articulated open-ended answers gave way for social
desirability bias to alter the responses provided, and therefore our results as a whole.
The DSC grouping methodology has been thoroughly explored throughout this thesis.
This method has been investigated between conditions, individual difference measures (e.g.
GBJWS), and dependent measures (e.g. IJR scores). All of these analyses were performed in
order to establish this methodology’s criterion validity among other historically valid variables.
It is rare to find individual difference variables that are reliably predictive of JMBs among the
just-world hypothesis literature (Hafer & Begue, 2005). Unfortunately, only the dependent
measure variable IJR significantly predicted which defensive strategy participants chose, and
only in the adulterous condition. Nevertheless, it might be that participants’ written responses
are the most externally valid behavior in this study (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2010).
Baseline and experimental condition question latency and its predictive power
concerning immanent justice reasoning. In addition to the original hypotheses, a secondary
investigation was undertaken in which question response latencies were examined as a predictor
for IJR. Previous research has shown that response latencies can be indicators of emotional
arousal. Historically, Temple and Geisinger (1990) used true/false question response latencies
taken from word- and character-paired self-report statements that had different arousal levels.
They found that the arousing statements took participants significantly longer to respond to, as
compared to the emotionally neutral questions. In the present study, participants made
judgments based on the narrative, and reported the affective intensity they felt. Similar affect
and judgment questions were asked in the baseline and experimental conditions. When
controlling for participants’ response latencies in the baseline condition, causal judgment
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response latencies were not reliable predictors of IJR. Neither the judgment, nor affect question
response latencies show any correlation with IJR.
In this thesis, question response latencies were not predictive of IJR. This might be
because of the fact that the baseline questions and experimental questions were not matched for
reading duration (i.e. by balancing character, syllable, and word counts between questions).
Rather, question response latencies were weighted on a word count basis. Additionally, where
this thesis employed a prior narrative in order to illicit arousal, Temple and Geisinger’s (1990)
experiment used the questions themselves as the affect stimuli to which participants were
reacting.
Study Conclusions
In recent years, social and cognitive psychologists have been investigating the interaction
among beliefs, attitudes, and behavior in great detail. Just-world theory is unique because it
investigates how an individual’s world-view influences his/her behavior when confronted with
an injustice. One of the clearest findings in this study is that when participants blamed David for
his circumstances, their emotions (as shown by physiological measures) were predictors that this
blame was taking place. When David “deserved” his outcome more because of his adulterous
behavior, the participants’ emotions were no longer an indicator that victim blame had taken
place. This suggests that the deservedness of an outcome effects the nature by which emotions
influence victim blame. That being said, witnessing injustice seems to be emotionally
provoking, whether or not it is perceived as deserved. No difference was found between the
adulterous and non-adulterous conditions with regard to physiological arousal. Yet this was not
consistent with participants’ reports regarding the level of emotionality provoked by the stimuli.
It is also remarkable that this was accomplished using relatively low quality equipment to assess
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only two physiological measures: heart rate and galvanic skin response. It appears as though the
utility of physiological measures is their ability to shed light on the divergence between what
was said and what was felt in testable, scientific ways. Research in just-world theory would be
well served if more advanced physiological indicators were used.
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Appendix A: Acronym Key

Key:
(IV) Independent Variable
(DV) Dependent Variable
(SC) Skin Conductance
(GSR) Galvanic Skin Response
(PST) Peripheral Skin temperature
(HR) Heart rate
(BPM) Beats per Minute
(RSA) Respiratory Sinus Arrhythmia
(PEP) Pre-ejection Period
(PTT) Pulse Transit Time
(BJW) Belief in a Just World
(GBJWS) Lupkus (1991) General Belief in a Just World Scale
(JMB) Justice Motivated Behavior
(IJR) Immanent Justice Reasoning
(NCR) Naturalistic Causal Rationalization
(DSC) Defensive Strategy Class: Chance, Fate, Justice, naturalistic-incomplete, naturalistic
complete, and other
Adulterous Condition, Just valence, More Deserved, More Just
Non-Adulterous Condition, Unjust valence, Less Deserved, Less Just
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Appendix B: Baseline Caffeine Stimulus
Canadian Living : Health : Nutrition : Coffee: Good News
http://www.canadianliving.com/coffee...

Coffee: Good News Is Filtering Through
BY JULIA SLATER

Fast Coffee Facts
• 81% of Canadians drink coffee at least
occasionally.

For those of us who depend on our daily
dose of java, the evidence is in: Coffee, in
moderation, is not bad for you after all. In
fact, some studies indicate it may even have
some health benefits.
For years the public was warned of the dangers of
coffee, the main source of caffeine in the North
American diet. In one well-publicized New
England Journal of Medicine study released in
1981, researchers found a link between coffee and
pancreatic cancer. But when at least seven other
studies failed to back up that finding, those results
had to be retracted.
Now, more than 19,000 dietary caffeine studies
have been done, and many experts agree that
moderate daily caffeine intake – 300 to 400
milligrams, about 3 to 4 cups of coffee – is not
harmful. Here’s more good news about coffee:
Coffee and cancer.

• More than 63% of Canadians over the age of
18 drink coffee on a daily basis, making it the #
1 beverage choice of adult Canadians.
• Daily coffee consumption varies across the
country, from a high of 70% in Quebec to a low
of just over 53% in the Atlantic region.
• Canadian coffee drinkers consume an average
of 2.6 cups of coffee per day. Men and women
are equally likely to be coffee consumers, with
men drinking slightly more coffee than women.
• 20% of Canadian like their coffee black, 7%
with sugar only, 33% with cream or milk only;
40% like both dairy and a sweetener.
• Coffee is more popular in Canada than the
United States, with just 49% of Americans
drinking coffee on a daily basis.
• For several decades coffee has been more
popular than tea, milk, beer, fruit juices and soft
drinks among Canadians.
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The Iowa Women's Health Study investigated
caffeine intake and postmenopausal breast cancer
incidence among 34,388 Iowa women aged 55 to
69. No association was found between coffee and
breast cancer. Similarly, a Harvard study of
almost 122,000 nurses found that those who drank
coffee had lower rates of breast cancer than those
who drank no coffee.
A recent study of 61,000 Swedish women
over nine years concluded that coffee does
not cause colorectal cancer. Several studies
have found that coffee drinkers may even
have a lower risk of colorectal cancer, but
results have not been consistent.

1 of 2
6:31PM

• Coffee is a morning beverage, with nearly 51% of
coffee consumed at breakfast, 16% in the balance of the
morning, 9% at lunch, 10% in the afternoon, 8% at
dinner and 7% in the evening.
• More than half (66%) of coffee is consumed at home,
12% is consumed at work, 16% is consumed or
purchased at eating places and 5% is consumed in other
places such as hospitals, schools,
hockey rinks.
10/9/2008
Drinking coffee in-transit rose from 2% in 1999 to 7%
in 2003.

Although some studies have shown that
excessive coffee drinking could cause
bladder cancer, others have found that it is
more likely the excessive smoking along
with the coffee that causes this type of
cancer.

• 79% of coffee consumed at home is purchased at a
grocery store/supermarket, with 7% being purchased at
a gourmet/specialty coffee shop.

Caffeine may protect against Parkinson’s
disease.

• The share of total coffee consumption accounted for
by instant coffee is 17%.

Parkinson’s disease is a progressive nervous
disease that destroys dopamine-producing
brain cells. The resulting symptoms are
tremor, a slowing of movement, weakness
and facial paralysis. Researchers believe that
caffeine’s helpful effect may be that it
reduces the amount of dopamine depleted
from the brain.

• 37% of coffee drinkers have an awareness of
organic—up from 30% in 2001. Awareness of fairtrade coffee increased from 4% in 2001 to 11% in 2003.

A Harvard School of Public Health study
published last May reported that men who
drank four to five cups a day of caffeinated
coffee cut the risk of developing Parkinson’s
disease nearly in half compared to men who
consumed little or no caffeine daily. Women
who consumed between one and three cups
a day also cut their risk of developing
Parkinson’s disease nearly when compared
to women who drank less than a cup a day.
But this apparent benefit was lost at higher
levels of intake.

• Approximately 9% of coffee drinkers prefer
decaffeinated coffee on a regular basis.

Source: Coffee Association of Canada
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Caffeine and osteoporosis.
Although caffeine causes more calcium to
be excreted in the urine, the Osteoporosis
Society of Canada says that two or three
cups of coffee are not harmful if you get
enough calcium in your daily diet.
Dieticians recommend drinking a glass of
milk for every mug of coffee, or having a
café au lait (preferably with skim milk to
keep the fat content down).
Caffeine and athletic performance.
Researchers have found that caffeine
enhances physical endurance. However, it
does not appear to improve short-term highintensity activities like sprinting. Since it
can raise an athlete's metabolic level,
international sports organizations limit the
amount that can be found in urine.
Caffeine helps relieve headaches.
Caffeine increases the power of ASA and
other pain relievers, and is often combined
with them to treat headaches.
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Appendix C: David’s Story – Adulterous Condition
Canadian Living : Relationships : Friends & Family : David’s Story
http://www.canadianliving.com/relation...

David’s story

BY ALLAN WILSON

David* and Janice* were high school sweethearts. They married after
university, and David got a job with a consulting firm in Toronto. David spent
weekdays, weeknights and even weekends working for various projects between
his firm’s Toronto and Vancouver offices. “I became annoyed,” says Janice, a
teacher, “because I was working full-time, taking care of two children and
household chores, and he wouldn’t be available to do anything around the house or
with the kids. So we started having arguments over, ‘You’re never home. Can’t
you cancel one of your work projects?’ And he’d say, ‘No. This is my work, where
we get our money from.’”
Although Janice confronted David on a number of occasions about not being
home enough, things got worse. David, working more than ever, was rarely home.
One evening when Janice was doing laundry, she noticed a piece of paper in
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David’s pants that read: “David, please call me and I’ll set you up with the time of
your life. Susanne.”
“My heart sunk,” Janice said. She couldn’t believe it, “Is David having an
affair,” she said. Janice immediately phoned David on his cell phone, as he was
away in Vancouver. “I just screamed at him…’who is Susanne’…’who is Susanne’
over and over again. I was crying, and I told him to come home right away.” David
refused, saying he had some important clients to meet in the morning and that they
would talk about ‘Susanne’ when he got back into Toronto the following evening.
He assured her there was nothing to worry about.
The truth is that David was having an extramarital affair. David met Susanne at
one of his company’s cocktail parties while away in Vancouver. The important
“client” David met that morning was Susanne, a travel agent who often dealt with
his company. David met Susanne at his hotel before boarding his flight back to
Toronto.
“I realized I had been neglecting Janice and our children for the sake of my
work. But my work is my work, so I had to be away the amount that I was. As a
consequence, certain ‘needs’ of mine were not being met,” said David. “I met
Susanne at our last company party, and we hit it off right away. That evening I
went back to Susanne’s place…that was the first time we had ‘relations.’ We got
together every night for the rest of the time I was in Vancouver. The day before I
left back to Toronto I approached Robert, my company’s president, and told him
that I needed to be in Vancouver to better serve the needs of our clients. To my
surprise, Robert was fully supportive and said we could work out the details back
in Toronto the following week. What I really wanted, though, was to be with
Susanne,” said David.
“I was on my way to the airport when Susanne phoned me and said she had a
surprise for me, but that I need to come to her travel agency to see what it was. I
was short on time, so she agreed to meet me at the airport instead. Her ‘surprise’
was a wonderful vacation package to Mexico for her and I that she knew I was
going to love,” said David.
“Back in Toronto, I got off the plane…I had everything with me...my laptop,
files, but most importantly, the vacation tickets. I looked straight ahead and saw
my car across the street…”
“…I was walking towards my car…it happened so quickly.... the car careening
out of control around the corner as I crossed the street to my car. There wasn’t
even a moment for me to think. They said that the elderly driver hit the gas
mistakenly instead of the brake. I remember very little after that. The police said
that she hit me hard enough to throw my body into the air, then as I came down my
face was pinned between the windshield of the crushed car and the ground."
"I was in the hospital for three weeks after the incident. The doctors told me I
had a concussion, broken ribs, cracked vertebrae, a broken leg, and needed a
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number of stitches in my elbow. I hope I can get back on track in time to go on that
vacation with Susanne."
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Appendix D: David’s Story – Non-Adulterous Condition
Canadian Living : Relationships : Friends & Family : David’s Story
http://www.canadianliving.com/relation...

David’s story

BY ALLAN WILSON

David* and Janice* were high school sweethearts. They married after
university, and David got a job with a consulting firm in Toronto. David spent
weekdays, weeknights and even weekends working for various projects between
his firm’s Toronto and Vancouver offices. “I became annoyed,” says Janice, a
teacher, “because I was working full-time, taking care of two children and
household chores, and he wouldn’t be available to do anything around the house or
with the kids. So we started having arguments over, ‘You’re never home. Can’t
you cancel one of your work projects?’ And he’d say, ‘No. This is my work, where
we get our money from.’”
Although Janice confronted David on a number of occasions about not being
home enough, things got worse. David, working more than ever, was rarely home.
One evening when Janice was doing laundry, she noticed a piece of paper in
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David’s pants that read: “David, please call me and I’ll set you up with the time of
your life. Susanne.”
“My heart sunk,” Janice said. She couldn’t believe it, “Is David having an
affair,” she said. Janice immediately phoned David on his cell phone, as he was
away in Vancouver. “I just screamed at him…’who is Susanne’…’who is Susanne’
over and over again. I was crying, and I told him to come home right away.” David
refused, saying he had some important clients to meet in the morning and that they
would talk about ‘Susanne’ when he got back into Toronto the following evening.
He assured her there was nothing to worry about.
The truth is that David was not having an extramarital affair. David met
Susanne at one of his company’s cocktail parties while away in Vancouver. The
important client David met that morning was Susanne, a travel agent who often
dealt with his company. David met Susanne at his hotel before boarding his flight
back to Toronto.
“I realized I had been neglecting Janice and our children for the sake of my
work. I got so tied up with work for far too long, and realized that my wife and
children needed me around much more…and I needed them too,” said David. “At
our last company party in Vancouver, I approached Susanne and asked her if she
could think of a ‘dream’ vacation that I could surprise Janice and the kids with.
She gave me the note that Janice found in my pants and said for me to get back to
her the next time I was in town. That very same evening I approached Robert, my
company’s president, and told him I want to work less so I could spend more time
at home, and I told him I needed to stay in Toronto. To my surprise, Robert was
fully supportive and said we could work out the details back in Toronto the
following week,” David said.
“Susanne agreed to meet me at my hotel because I was short on time and
couldn’t make it to the travel agency in time before my flight. She agreed, and had
in hand a wonderful vacation package to Mexico that I knew my family was going
to love,” said David.
“Back in Toronto, I got off the plane…I had everything with me...my laptop,
files, but most importantly, the vacation tickets. I looked straight ahead and saw
my car across the street…”
“…I was walking towards my car…it happened so quickly.... the car careening
out of control around the corner as I crossed the street to my car. There wasn’t
even a moment for me to think. They said that the elderly driver hit the gas
mistakenly instead of the brake. I remember very little after that. The police said
that she hit me hard enough to throw my body into the air, then as I came down my
face was pinned between the windshield of the crushed car and the ground."
"I was in the hospital for three weeks after the incident. The doctors told me I had
a concussion, broken ribs, cracked vertebrae, a broken leg, and needed a number of
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stitches in my elbow. I hope I can get back on track in time to go on that vacation
with my family."
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Appendix E: Social Conservatism Scale

Please place a check mark if you agree or are supportive of the following: (Yes, No)
Death penalty C
Multiculturalism L
Stiffer jail terms C
Sex outside of marriage L
Voluntary euthanasia L
Bible truth C
Gay rights L
Premarital virginity C
Middle East immigration L
Church authority C
Legalized abortion L
Condom vending machines L
Legalized prostitution L
(Henningham, 1996)
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Appendix F: Global Belief in a Just World Scale
Please answer how much you agree or disagree with each statement in a general sense:
(1 Strongly Agree to 5 Strongly Disagree)
1 I feel that people get what they are entitled to have.
2 I feel that a person's efforts are noticed and rewarded.
3 I feel that people earn the rewards and punishments they get.
4 I feel that people who meet with misfortune have brought it on themselves.
5 I feel that people get what they deserve.
6 I feel that rewards and punishments are fairly given.
7 I basically feel that the world is a fair place.
(Lipkus, 1991)

113

PSYSIOLOGICAL REASONING

114

Appendix G: Informed Consent
Consent to Participate in Research

We are conducting a study to assess how different forms of media affect you emotionally.
During the experiment, you will be exposed to media source stimuli, and asked to answer a few
questions about your impressions via a computer interface. We ask that you answer the
questions as thoroughly and honestly as possible—there are no right or wrong answers. In
addition, your physiological measures (heart rate, galvanic skin response, pulse pressure) will be
taken throughout the course of the study using three finger clips. Near the end of the study, you
will be asked to perform a difficult arithmetic task.
All of your responses – be they physiological or otherwise – will be kept anonymous, and
your name will not be directly connected to them. This includes any response you made during
the preliminary survey. Any publications or presentations based on this study will not disclose
any identifying information about you or any other participants. At the conclusion of this
research project, we expect to disseminate our results by publication in a professional journal or
conference presentation. Again, no personally identifying information will be disclosed.
You will be exposed to minimal risk by participating in this study. It is estimated that you
should be able to complete your participation within approximately 30 to 45 minutes. Most
importantly, participating will allow you to gain a better understanding of how psychological
research is conducted, and your responses may help to further our understanding of
psychological issues.
Your decision whether or not to participate is completely voluntary and will not prejudice
your future relations with Eastern Michigan University. You have the right to discontinue the
study at any time during your participation, without penalty or loss of benefits of any type. If you
have any questions, you can contact Reino Bruner (rbruner@emich.edu).
In the unlikely event that distressing personal concerns arise for you during or after your participation in this study,
EMU students are eligible for free counseling services at:
313 Snow Health Center, Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti, Michigan 48197
(Telephone: 734.487.1118; Email: Counseling.Services@emich.edu).
By signing below, you agree to participate in the study:
________________________________________________
Print Name
________________________________________________

___________

Signature

Date

This research protocol and informed consent document has been reviewed and approved by the Eastern Michigan
University Human Subjects Review Committee for use from 3/12/12 to 3/11/13 (date). If you have questions about
the approval process, please contact Dr. Deb de Laski-Smith (734.487.0042, Interim Dean of the Graduate School
and Administrative Co-chair of UHSRC, human.subjects@emich.edu).
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Appendix H: Physiological Scoring Algorithm
options(warn = 0 )
source("convert.seconds.r")
stamps = read.csv( "physiotimestamp3.csv" ,header=TRUE)
for(j in 1:109){
options(warn = -1 )
participant = stamps[j,1]
phy.data=read.table(paste(participant,sep=""), sep="\t",header=TRUE)
stamps = read.csv( "physiotimestamp3.csv" ,header=TRUE)
sindex = which( stamps[,1] == participant)
offset = ceiling( stamps[sindex,2] )
#########Step1: Remove gain, by multiplying Peak, and Gain. Rewrite clock data into readable form.
op <- options(digits.secs=3)
contain <-cbind( 0, phy.data[,2],round( phy.data[,3]*phy.data[,4], digits=5) , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
for( i in {1}:{length(as.character(phy.data[,1]))+offset} )
{contain[i-offset,1] <- convert.seconds(as.character(phy.data[i,1]))}
#########Step2: Mark the peak time refrence between peaks.###############################
last.trial=length(contain[,1])-1
for(i in 2:last.trial)
{contain[i,4] <- if( as.numeric(contain[i-1,3]) <= as.numeric( contain[i,3]) &
as.numeric(contain[i+1,3]) < as.numeric(contain[i,3]) &
as.numeric( contain[i,3]) >= 1){as.numeric( contain[i,3])} else{0}}
######### Detect Low ################################################################
for(i in 2:{length(contain[,1])-9})
{index <- 0
if(contain[i,4] != 0)
{index <- which( contain[{i}:{i+9},3] == min( contain[{i}:{i+9},3] ))
contain[i+index-1,5] <- if( contain[i+index-1,3] != 0) {contain[i+index-1,3]} else{0.0001}}}
##########Step3: Mark the BPM for every peak #########################################
##########Step4: Fill in the BPM for current peak, to last peak. ############################
for(i in {51}:{length(contain[,1])-1})
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{if(contain[i ,4] != 0 ){c=1
repeat {if(contain[i-c ,4]==0){c = c+1}else{break} }
p=c*0.032
bpm <- round( (1/as.numeric(p))*60 ,digits = 2)
z=0
repeat {contain[i-z ,6] <- bpm
if(z=={c-1}){break} else {z=z+1}}}}
##########Step6: Too High ############################################################
##########Step7: Too Low ############################################################
for(i in {1}:{124}){contain[i,6] <- 80
contain[i,7] <- 80}
for(i in {124}:{length(contain[,1])} )
{if( 1.25*mean( contain[{i- 62}:{i-1},7]) < contain[i,6] )
{contain[i,7] <- 1.10*mean( contain[{i- 62}:{i-1},7])}
else if( 0.65*mean( contain[{i-124}:{i-1},7]) > contain[i,6] )
{contain[i,7] <- 0.95*mean( contain[{i-124}:{i-1},7] )}
else{contain[i,7] <- contain[i,6]}}
##########Step5: Add a two second, before and after average buffer.#########################
last.trial=length(contain[,1])-63
for(i in 63:last.trial)
{contain[i,8] <- round( mean( contain[{i-62}:{i+62},7]) , 2)}
##########Step6: Peak Pressure ########################################################
### linear interpolation
### scrub transitions
for(i in {51}:{length(contain[,1])-1})
{x = 0; c = 1
repeat {x <- i-c
if( contain[x ,4] != 0 ){break} else {c = c+1}
z <- i-c}
op <- options(digits.secs=3)
spread = as.numeric(contain[i,4]) - as.numeric(contain[z,4])
inc = spread/(i-z);k=z
repeat {if( contain[i,4] == 0 ){break}
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contain[k,9] <- round(as.numeric(contain[z,4])+(k-z)*inc, digits=4)
if(k==i){break}
k=k+1}}
##########Step7: Low Pressure ########################################################
### linear interpolation
### scrub transitions
for(i in {51}:{length(contain[,1])-1})
{x = 0; c = 1
repeat {x <- i-c
if( contain[x ,5] != 0 ){break} else {c = c+1}
z <- i-c}
op <- options(digits.secs=3)
spread = as.numeric(contain[i,5]) - as.numeric(contain[z,5])
inc = spread/(i-z);k=z
repeat {if( contain[i,5] == 0 ){break}
contain[k,10] <- round(as.numeric(contain[z,5])+(k-z)*inc, digits=5)
if(k==i){break}
k=k+1}}
##########Step8: Pressure Spread ######################################################
for(i in {51}:{length(contain[,1])-1})
{contain[i,11] <- round(as.numeric(contain[i,9]) - as.numeric(contain[i,10]), digits=4)}
##########Step9: Heart Beat Variablity #################################################
##########Step10: H.B. Max-Min/Range ################################################
##########Step11: Section Group ######################################################
timeset <- cbind(rep(0,length(as.character(phy.data[,1]))))
for( i in {1}:{length(as.character(phy.data[,1]))+offset})
{timeset[i-offset,1] <- as.character(phy.data[i,1]) }
test <- timeset
#test <- as.character(phy.data[,1])
temp <- data.frame(second=contain[,1], gsr=contain[,2], raw.p=contain[,3], peak.mark=contain[,4], trough.mark=contain[,5],
raw.bpm=contain[,6],filter.bpm=contain[,7],buffer.bpm=contain[,8],p.pressure=contain[,9],t.preasure=contain[,10],pres.sprea
d=contain[,11],time.marker=test)
write.table(temp, paste(participant, ".csv",sep=""), append=FALSE, row.names=FALSE,sep=",")
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######################E-prime Time Stamp Scoring Section ###############################
options(warn = 0 )
source("convert.seconds.r")
stamps = read.csv( "physiotimestamp3.csv" ,header=TRUE)
options(warn = -1 )
participant = stamps[j,1];participant
phy.data=read.table(paste(participant,sep=""), sep="\t",header=TRUE)
stamps = read.csv( "physiotimestamp3.csv" ,header=TRUE)
sindex = which( stamps[,1] == participant)
offset = ceiling( stamps[sindex,2] )
contain = read.csv(paste(participant, ".csv",sep=""), stringsAsFactors=FALSE) #trim last line, and use as.numeric
contain = contain[,-12]
contain = as.matrix(contain)
#contain[200:210,]
index4 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,4] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index5 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,5] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index6 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,6] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index7 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,7] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index8 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,8] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index9 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,9] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index10 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,10] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index11 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,11] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index12 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,12] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index13 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,13] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index14 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,14] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index15 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,15] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index16 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,16] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index17 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,17] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index18 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,18] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index19 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,19] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index20 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,20] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index21 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,21] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index22 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,22] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
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index23 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,23] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index24 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,24] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index25 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,25] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index26 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,26] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index27 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,27] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index28 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,28] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index29 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,29] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index30 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,30] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index31 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,31] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index32 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,32] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index33 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,33] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index34 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,34] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index35 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,35] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index36 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,36] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index37 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,37] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index38 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,38] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
index39 = round( which.min( abs( contain[ { 1 }:{length(contain[,1])} ] - stamps[sindex,39] ) )*0.989413 , 0)
gsr.means = cbind( mean(contain[ {index4}:{index5},2 ]), mean(contain[ {index6}:{index7},2 ]), mean(contain[
{index8}:{index9},2 ]), mean(contain[ {index10}:{index11},2 ]), mean(contain[ {index12}:{index13},2 ]), mean(contain[
{index14}:{index15},2 ]), mean(contain[ {index16}:{index17},2 ]), mean(contain[ {index18}:{index19},2 ]), mean(contain[
{index20}:{index21},2 ]), mean(contain[ {index22}:{index23},2 ]), mean(contain[ {index24}:{index25},2 ]), mean(contain[
{index26}:{index27},2 ]), mean(contain[ {index28}:{index29},2 ]), mean(contain[ {index30}:{index31},2 ]), mean(contain[
{index32}:{index33},2 ]), mean(contain[ {index34}:{index35},2 ]), mean(contain[ {index36}:{index37},2 ]), mean(contain[
{index38}:{index39},2 ]))
bpm.means = cbind( mean(contain[ {index4}:{index5},8 ]), mean(contain[ {index6}:{index7},8 ]), mean(contain[
{index8}:{index9},8 ]), mean(contain[ {index10}:{index11},8 ]), mean(contain[ {index12}:{index13},8 ]), mean(contain[
{index14}:{index15},8 ]), mean(contain[ {index16}:{index17},8 ]), mean(contain[ {index18}:{index19},8 ]), mean(contain[
{index20}:{index21},8 ]), mean(contain[ {index22}:{index23},8 ]), mean(contain[ {index24}:{index25},8 ]), mean(contain[
{index26}:{index27},8 ]), mean(contain[ {index28}:{index29},8 ]), mean(contain[ {index30}:{index31},8 ]), mean(contain[
{index32}:{index33},8 ]), mean(contain[ {index34}:{index35},8 ]), mean(contain[ {index36}:{index37},8 ]), mean(contain[
{index38}:{index39},8 ]))
ppp.means = cbind( mean(contain[ {index4}:{index5},9 ]), mean(contain[ {index6}:{index7},9 ]), mean(contain[
{index8}:{index9},9 ]), mean(contain[ {index10}:{index11},9 ]), mean(contain[ {index12}:{index13},9 ]), mean(contain[
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{index14}:{index15},9 ]), mean(contain[ {index16}:{index17},9 ]), mean(contain[ {index18}:{index19},9 ]), mean(contain[
{index20}:{index21},9 ]), mean(contain[ {index22}:{index23},9 ]), mean(contain[ {index24}:{index25},9 ]), mean(contain[
{index26}:{index27},9 ]), mean(contain[ {index28}:{index29},9 ]), mean(contain[ {index30}:{index31},9 ]), mean(contain[
{index32}:{index33},9 ]), mean(contain[ {index34}:{index35},9 ]), mean(contain[ {index36}:{index37},9 ]), mean(contain[
{index38}:{index39},9 ]))
tpp.means = cbind( mean(contain[ {index4}:{index5},10 ]), mean(contain[ {index6}:{index7},10 ]), mean(contain[
{index8}:{index9},10 ]), mean(contain[ {index10}:{index11},10 ]), mean(contain[ {index12}:{index13},10 ]), mean(contain[
{index14}:{index15},10 ]), mean(contain[ {index16}:{index17},10 ]), mean(contain[ {index18}:{index19},10 ]), mean(contain[
{index20}:{index21},10 ]), mean(contain[ {index22}:{index23},10 ]), mean(contain[ {index24}:{index25},10 ]), mean(contain[
{index26}:{index27},10 ]), mean(contain[ {index28}:{index29},10 ]), mean(contain[ {index30}:{index31},10 ]), mean(contain[
{index32}:{index33},10 ]), mean(contain[ {index34}:{index35},10 ]), mean(contain[ {index36}:{index37},10 ]), mean(contain[
{index38}:{index39},10 ]))
gsr.sd = cbind( sd(contain[ {index4}:{index5},2 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index6}:{index7},2 ], na.rm=TRUE),
sd(contain[ {index8}:{index9},2 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index10}:{index11},2 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index12}:{index13},2 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index14}:{index15},2 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index16}:{index17},2 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index18}:{index19},2 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index20}:{index21},2 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index22}:{index23},2 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index24}:{index25},2 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index26}:{index27},2 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index28}:{index29},2 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index30}:{index31},2 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index32}:{index33},2 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index34}:{index35},2 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index36}:{index37},2 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index38}:{index39},2 ], na.rm=TRUE))
bpm.sd = cbind( sd(contain[ {index4}:{index5},8 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index6}:{index7},8 ], na.rm=TRUE),
sd(contain[ {index8}:{index9},8 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index10}:{index11},8 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index12}:{index13},8 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index14}:{index15},8 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index16}:{index17},8 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index18}:{index19},8 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index20}:{index21},8 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index22}:{index23},8 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index24}:{index25},8 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index26}:{index27},8 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index28}:{index29},8 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index30}:{index31},8 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index32}:{index33},8 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index34}:{index35},8 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index36}:{index37},8 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index38}:{index39},8 ], na.rm=TRUE))
ppp.sd = cbind( sd(contain[ {index4}:{index5},9 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index6}:{index7},9 ], na.rm=TRUE),
sd(contain[ {index8}:{index9},9 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index10}:{index11},9 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index12}:{index13},9 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index14}:{index15},9 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
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{index16}:{index17},9 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index18}:{index19},9 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index20}:{index21},9 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index22}:{index23},9 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index24}:{index25},9 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index26}:{index27},9 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index28}:{index29},9 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index30}:{index31},9 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index32}:{index33},9 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index34}:{index35},9 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index36}:{index37},9 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index38}:{index39},9 ], na.rm=TRUE))
tpp.sd = cbind( sd(contain[ {index4}:{index5},10 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index6}:{index7},10 ], na.rm=TRUE),
sd(contain[ {index8}:{index9},10 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index10}:{index11},10 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index12}:{index13},10 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index14}:{index15},10 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index16}:{index17},10 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index18}:{index19},10 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index20}:{index21},10 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index22}:{index23},10 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index24}:{index25},10 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index26}:{index27},10 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index28}:{index29},10 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index30}:{index31},10 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index32}:{index33},10 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index34}:{index35},10 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[
{index36}:{index37},10 ], na.rm=TRUE), sd(contain[ {index38}:{index39},10 ], na.rm=TRUE))
physio.data =
data.frame(participant=participant,offset=offset,gsr.means,bpm.means,ppp.means,tpp.means,gsr.sd,bpm.sd,ppp.sd,tpp.sd)
colnames(physio.data)
=c("part","offset","bs.gm","bq.gm","bo.gm","g1.gm","ijr.010e.gm","ijr.01e.gm","ijr.11e.gm","ijr.14e.gm","ijr.13e.gm","i
jr.24e.gm","ijr.57e.gm","ijr.510e.gm","ijr.67e.gm","ijr.810e.gm","g2.gm","ai.gm","at.gm","aq.gm","bs.bm","bq.bm","bo.
bm","g1.bm","ijr.010e.bm","ijr.01e.bm","ijr.11e.bm","ijr.14e.bm","ijr.13e.bm","ijr.24e.bm","ijr.57e.bm","ijr.510e.bm","
ijr.67e.bm","ijr.810e.bm","g2.bm","ai.bm","at.bm","aq.bm","bs.pm","bq.pm","bo.pm","g1.pm","ijr.010e.pm","ijr.01e.p
m","ijr.11e.pm","ijr.14e.pm","ijr.13e.pm","ijr.24e.pm","ijr.57e.pm","ijr.510e.pm","ijr.67e.pm","ijr.810e.pm","g2.pm","ai
.pm","at.pm","aq.pm","bs.tm","bq.tm","bo.tm","g1.tm","ijr.010e.tm","ijr.01e.tm","ijr.11e.tm","ijr.14e.tm","ijr.13e.tm",
"ijr.24e.tm","ijr.57e.tm","ijr.510e.tm","ijr.67e.tm","ijr.810e.tm","g2.tm","ai.tm","at.tm","aq.tm","bs.gs","bq.gs","bo.gs"
,"g1.gs","ijr.010e.gs","ijr.01e.gs","ijr.11e.gs","ijr.14e.gs","ijr.13e.gs","ijr.24e.gs","ijr.57e.gs","ijr.510e.gs","ijr.67e.gs","ijr.
810e.gs","g2.gs","ai.gs","at.gs","aq.gs","bs.bs","bq.bs","bo.bs","g1.bs","ijr.010e.bs","ijr.01e.bs","ijr.11e.bs","ijr.14e.bs",
"ijr.13e.bs","ijr.24e.bs","ijr.57e.bs","ijr.510e.bs","ijr.67e.bs","ijr.810e.bs","g2.bs","ai.bs","at.bs","aq.bs","bs.ps","bq.ps",
"bo.ps","g1.ps","ijr.010e.ps","ijr.01e.ps","ijr.11e.ps","ijr.14e.ps","ijr.13e.ps","ijr.24e.ps","ijr.57e.ps","ijr.510e.ps","ijr.67e
.ps","ijr.810e.ps","g2.ps","ai.ps","at.ps","aq.ps","bs.ts","bq.ts","bo.ts","g1.ts","ijr.010e.ts","ijr.01e.ts","ijr.11e.ts","ijr.14
e.ts","ijr.13e.ts","ijr.24e.ts","ijr.57e.ts","ijr.510e.ts","ijr.67e.ts","ijr.810e.ts","g2.ts","ai.ts","at.ts","aq.ts")
write.table(physio.data, "physio.data3.csv" , append=TRUE, row.names=FALSE,sep=",")}
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Appendix I: Dependent Measure Questions

Condition
Caffeine
Baseline
Caffeine
Baseline
Caffeine
Baseline
Caffeine
Baseline
Caffeine
Baseline
Caffeine
Baseline
Caffeine
Baseline
Caffeine
Baseline
Caffeine
Baseline
Caffeine
Baseline
Caffeine
Baseline
Caffeine
Baseline
IJR
Condition
IJR
Condition

Question
Type

Exposure
Order

Personal

1

Has this article affected how you will consume coffee in the future?

Affect

2

In terms of fear, this article made me feel:

Judgment

3

Judgment

4

Personal

5

Did you find the article’s “facts” (in yellow) interesting?

Affect

6

In terms of happiness, reading this article made me feel:

Judgment

7

Do you feel that common illnesses in this day and age, are often due
to (or made worse by) the over consumption of caffeine?

Affect

8

To what extent did you find this article emotionally involving?

Personal

9

Do you think you drink too much caffeine?

Personal

10

Deserving

11

OpenEnded

12

How might you change the way you consume caffeine in the future?

Affect

1

In terms of anger, this article made me feel:

Causal
Judgment

2

To what extent do you feel David’s accident was the result of his
dealings with Susanne?

Questions

How common do you think it is for people to have medical
complications due to their caffeine consumption?
To what extent do you feel the heavy consumption of caffeine results
in some form of sickness?

Do you feel the science of caffeine research has a lot farther to go
before we have a good understanding of caffeine’s effects on the
body?
If person gets sick from consuming large amounts of caffeine
habitually, do you feel s/he deserves it?

Likert Scale 1 - 7
1: Trivial
7: Very effective
1: Not at all fearful
7: A great deal fear
1: Not at all common
7: A great deal common

1: Not at all
7: A great deal
1: Not interesting
7: Very interesting
1: Not at all happy
7: A great deal happy
1: Not effected
7: A great deal effected
1: Not at all emotionally involving
7: Extremely emotionally involving

1: Not too much at all
7: A great deal too much
1: Totally Understood
7: A great deal farther
1: Totally Understood
7: A great deal farther
Open-Ended
1: Not at all
7: A great deal
1: Not at all
7: A great deal
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IJR
Condition

Affect

3

To what extent did you find this article emotionally involving?

1: Not at all emotionally involving
7 :A great deal emotionally
involving

IJR
Condition

Deserved

4

To what extent do you believe that David deserved to be in the
accident?

1: Not at all deserving
7: A great deal deserving

Deserved

5

On the basis of what you read, how would you rate David as a person
(please select with mouse)?

Very Bad, Fairly Bad, A little
Bad, Neither Good nor Bad, A
little Good, Fairly Good, Very
Good

Affect

6

In terms of happiness, reading this article made me feel:

Filler

7

How common do you think the events of David’s life happen in the
real world?

Judgment

8

To what extent do you feel that David’s accident was foreseeable?

Judgment

9

To what extent do you feel that people like David will have bad
things happen to them?

Filler

10

To what extent do you feel that David’s accident was controllable?

Filler

11

How likely is it that you could be in the same accident as David?

IJR
Condition

Filler

12

Do you believe the events of David’s life really took place as the
news report describes?

IJR
Condition

Judgment

13

IJR
Condition

OpenEnded

14

IJR
Condition
IJR
Condition
IJR
Condition
IJR
Condition
IJR
Condition
IJR
Condition
IJR
Condition

Arithmetic
Task
Arithmetic
Task

How possible is it that the stress David had felt previously with his
travel agent affected his ability to walk across streets safely?
“Do you think there is a relationship between David’s car accident,
and his dealings with Susanne, and why? Please explain your
thoughts in detail.”

1

How well did you perform the arithmetic task?

2

How difficult did you find the arithmetic task was to perform?

1: Not at all happy
7: A great deal happy
1: Not at all common
7: A great deal common
1: Not at all
7: A great deal
1: Not at all
7: A great deal
1: Not at all
7: A great deal
1: Not likely at all
7: A great deal likely

1: Not at all like the news report
7: A great deal like the news
report
1: Not at all possible
7: A great deal possible
Open-Ended
1: Horribly
7: Extremely well
1: Extremely Easy
7: Extremely Difficult
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3

How much effort did you put into performing the arithmetic task?

4

Do you feel you were good at the arithmetic task?

5

Did you have a hard time keeping the numbers straight in your mind?

6
7
8
9
10

How hard did you try to keep up your speed after some time had
passed?
Do you think you would be better than the average person at this
arithmetic task?
Did you find the arithmetic task to be frustrating?
Did you feel that much of the time you could have gone much faster
than you were going?
Do you feel that your agitation while performing the arithmetic task
slowed your progress?

1: No effort at all
7: Great deal of effort
1: Very poor
7: Very good
1: Extremely easy
7: Extremely hard
1: Did not try at all
7: Very hard
1: Worse than most
7: Better than most
1: Extremely easy
7: Extremely frustrating
1: None of the time
7: All the time
1: Not slowed at all
7: Slowed a great deal

